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Abstract
On The Security of Wide Area Measurement System and Phasor Data Collection
Reem Kateb, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2019
Smart grid is a typical cyber-physical system that presents the dependence of power
system operations on cyber infrastructure for control, monitoring, and protection purposes.
The rapid deployment of phasor measurements in smart grid transmission system has
opened opportunities to utilize new applications and enhance the grid operations. Thus, the
smart grid has become more dependent on communication and information technologies
such as Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS). WAMS are used to collect real-time
measurements from different sensors such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) installed
across widely dispersed areas. Such system will improve real-time monitoring and control;
however, recent studies have pointed out that the use of WAMS introduces significant vul-
nerabilities to cyber-attacks that can be leveraged by attackers. Therefore, preventing or
reducing the damage of cyber attacks on WAMS is critical to the security of the smart grid.
In this thesis, we focus our attention on the relation between WAMS security and the IP
routing protocol, which is an essential aspect to the collection of sensors measurements.
Synchrophasor measurements from different PMUs are transferred through a data net-
work and collected at one or multiple data concentrators. The timely collection of phasors
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from PMU dispersed across the grid allows to maintain system observability and take cor-
rective actions when needed. This collection is made possible through Phasor Data Con-
centrators (PDCs) that time-align and aggregate phasor measurements, and forward the
resulting stream to be used by monitoring and control applications. WAMS applications
relying on these measurements have strict and stringent delay requirements, e.g., end to
end delay as well as delay variation between measurements from different PMUs. Mea-
surements arriving past a predetermined time period at a data concentrator will be dropped,
causing incompleteness of data and affecting WAMS applications and hence the system’s
operations. It has been shown that non-functional properties, such as data delay and packet
drops, have a negative impact on the system functionality.
We show that simply forwarding measurements from PMUs through shortest routes to
phasor data collectors may result in data being dropped at their destinations. We believe
therefore that there is a strong interplay between the routing paths (delays along the paths)
for gathering the measurements and the value of timeout period. This is particularly trou-
bling when a malicious attacker deliberately causes delays on some communication links
along the shortest routes. Therefore, we present a mathematical model for constructing
forwarding trees for PMUs’ measurements which satisfy the end to end delay as well as the
delay variation requirements of WAMS applications at data concentrators. We show that a
simple shortest path routing will result in larger fraction of data drop and that our method
will find a suitable solution. Then, we study the relation between cyber-attack propagation
and IP multicast routing. To this extent, we formulate the problem as the construction of
a multicast tree that minimizes the propagation of cyber-attacks while satisfying real-time
and capacity requirements. The proposed attack propagation multicast tree is evaluated
using different IEEE test systems. Finally, cyber-attacks resulting in the disconnection of
PDC(s) from WAMS initiate a loss of its phasor stream and incompleteness in the observ-
ability of the power system. Recovery strategies based on the re-routing of lost phasors to
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other connected and available PDCs need to be designed while considering the functional
requirements of WAMS. We formulate a recovery strategy from loss of compromised or
failed PDC(s) in the WAMS network based on the rerouting of disconnected PMUs to
functional PDCs. The proposed approach is mathematically formulated as a linear pro-
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The current electrical power system is by far the most significant and sophisticated en-
gineering system of the 20th century. This system contains a large network that connects
centralized generation, transmission, distribution, control centre, and power consumers.
Even though the traditional power system has served well in providing power supply to
consumers, many of today’s electrical grids are operating near to their stability limits due
to the increased power demands that have not been accompanied by an increase in trans-
mission capacity. As a result, the stability of such power systems becomes a serious issue
since operational security and reliability standards can be violated. Therefore, the grid is
becoming increasingly outdated and overburdened, leading to costly blackouts and environ-
mental damages [5]. Recent large blackouts and outages, such as the 2003 North American
and the 2015 Ukrainian blackouts, stand as a proof that the current grid lacks automated
analysis, have a slow response time, and low situational awareness [5, 6]. Further, recent
studies show that 8% of the produced power is wasted along transmission lines [7]. As cur-
rent power grids do not consist of storage units, the produced energy needs to be adjusted
to power consumption [8]. Moreover, to manage, operate, and control the grid in a reliable
and safe environment, a series of complex technical tasks at different times and geographic
areas must be accomplished.
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The occurrence of major blackouts in many power systems around the world has ne-
cessitated the use of better system monitoring and control methodologies. Under such
challenges, carrying out the grid operations on a real-time basis and responding to contin-
gencies are critical for maintaining a healthy, reliable, and stable power grid. Therefore, an
ever-increasing effort has been made in many countries to the development of a more intel-
ligent, responsive, efficient, and environmentally friendly ”smarter” power grid, known as
smart grid [7]. The main target of such grid is to connect the components of the electrical
grid via communication networks, such as Internet or sensor networks, to collect data about
the grid’s condition and consumers’ requirements.
The future smart grid can be defined as the modernization of the current power grid for
improved efficiency, reliability, and safety, with a sufficient integration of renewable and
alternative energy sources through modern controls and communication technologies [9].
The smart grid enables two-way communication of data and electrical power to provide
consumers with information to better manage their power usage. It is self-healing in case
of disturbances, such as physical attacks, cyber attacks, or natural disasters. Moreover, its
new infrastructure links and utilizes different energy resources, including renewable en-
ergy. Additionally, it aims at providing efficient delivery and better power quality [10].
Moreover, the smart grid aims at reducing CO2 emissions. Additionally, a number of Dis-
tributed Generators (DG) are inserted in the grid to satisfy the increased electrical demands.
Furthermore, original techniques, such as micro-grids that offer electricity for a certain area
using one or more DGs are utilized in the new smarter grid. Such grids allow the area to be
isolated or connected to the main grid based on the current grid’s status, which protects the
grid in case of blackouts or disturbances by assisting the self-healing properties of the grid.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposed a conceptual ar-
chitecture of the smart grid (Figure (1.1)), along with its electrical and communication
flows. The model consists of seven domains: Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distribution,
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Figure 1.1: NIST Smart Grid Conceptual Model [1]
Customers, Markets, Service Providers, and Operations [1]. The first four domains produce
and transfer electricity in two ways, while the other three achieve movement of electricity
and provide information to utilities and customers.
Smart grid utilizes different communication technologies to help in improving the grid’s
fault detection, electricity waste, and self-healing feature. As mentioned previously, the
main objectives of the smart grid are to reduce the power losses and stabilize the grid by
maintaining the electricity generation-consumption ratio, e.g., the electricity amount in the
grid is around a certain level all the time, which increases the efficiency of electricity gen-
eration. This upgrade requires merging sensors and measurement devices, such as smart
meters and Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), in the power grid. The main objective of
such sensors is to aggregate information about the grid status in widely dispersed areas.
On one hand, smart meters, deployed in the customer side, aggregate the electricity con-
sumption for each individual appliance and send the total consumption to the utility. After
that, the utility calculates the accurate electricity bill for each consumer. On the other hand,
PMUs are high-speed sensors distributed throughout the grid transmission and distribution
systems. They monitor the grid status and quickly detect any anomaly behaviors and threats
3
that could lead to blackouts.
1.2 WAMS
The evolution of the smart grid is driven by increasing power demand, unreliable power
flow, distributed system setting, and emerging renewable energy generation. To address
these challenges, the smart grid requires dynamic architecture, intelligent algorithms, and
efficient mechanisms. Such tasks include generation dispatch decisions on loads or ex-
pected demands, estimating the system state and contingency analysis operating every few
seconds to few minutes, and protection and control algorithms that operate every few mil-
liseconds. As a consequence, academic and industrial research witnessed a wave of discus-
sion towards the introduction of information and communication technologies with the aim
of increasing efficiency of power delivery and management. Therefore, a new measurement
system, the so-called Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS), has been introduced to
power system literature in the late 1980s. This system promises to offer a real-time monitor-
ing system used for synchronized data acquisition in order to control, monitor and manage
the performance of the smart grid. Having such a precise understanding of the opera-
tion conditions contributes significantly to achieving much-improved performance levels
of power systems. The effectiveness of the design of control schemes based on wide-area
information can also contribute to better systems utilization.
1.3 WAMS Security
The upgrade of the grid exposes it to cyber-physical security threats such as malicious
attacks that can forge the measurements coming from sensors installed in different substa-
tions, extract critical information from the readings, or establish Denial-of-Service (DoS)
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attacks. In addition, different security threats are introduced to the grid because of its spe-
cial nature, such as False Date Injection (FDI) attacks that inject fake information about
the grid’s status to mislead the control center to make wrong decisions that have a negative
impact on the grid stability and reliability. In the next subsection, we briefly introduce the
main security concerns.
1.3.1 Security Objectives
Cybersecurity tools and techniques are aimed at achieving three primary objectives for
the grid’s security, confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) described as follows:
 Confidentiality: ensures that only authorized entities have access to critical infor-
mation. The consumer’s privacy and confidentiality are of significant importance in
the grid. Eavesdropping on the exchanged messages between sensors and the control
center allows attackers to collect information regarding the device type, software ver-
sion, and configurations. For example, the attacker can gather important information
regarding electricity production and consumed power then sell such information to
other utilities. As a conclusion, the privacy and confidentiality of exchanged informa-
tion are important and should be taking into consideration in any proposed security
scheme.
 Integrity: ensures that any unauthorized modifications to the transferred data are de-
tected. An attacker can alter or fabricate the transferred information between differ-
ent domains in the grid. For example, the attacker compromises several measurement
units and exploits them to inject false information about the grid conditions. Such
an attack, known as False Data Injection (FDI), misleads the control center to make
improper decisions for the grid that has negative consequences in different parts of
the grid.
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 Availability: ensures that critical system information should be available when re-
quired. An attacker can target the network resources, e.g., by DoS attacks. In this
attack, the attacker aims at blocking, delaying, or corrupting the transmitted infor-
mation to make it unavailable for legitimate users. For example, the attacker can
delay or drop phasor measurements to blind the control center and influence control
decisions. Therefore, smart grid networks should be robust to availability attacks as
they could lead to severe consequences, such as losing real-time monitoring of the
critical power infrastructures, which subsequently lead to large-scale power system
disasters, i.e., huge blackouts.
As a result, many research efforts toward building a reliable distributed WAMS ar-
chitecture have been proposed recently. For example, the data network management task
team of North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) is working on implementing a
distributed WAMS architecture with a focus on protocols, QoS, latency, bandwidth, and
security [11]. It is obvious that this distributed architecture will increase the grid reliability
by removing single point failures as shown in [12]. Distributed algorithms in power grids
have been proposed in recent papers such as [13–17], in the context of distributed optimal
power flow, distributed generation, demand side management, and wide area oscillation
monitoring. However, this architecture has its drawbacks due to the lack of cyber-physical
research. In particular, communication delay, network availability, and its impact on the
real-time phasor application need to be studied, which is the purpose of this research. Al-
though a wealth of research has been proposed to address traditional cyber security threats,
many solutions do not adequately address the additional constraints required to support the
electric grid. Unlike more traditional IT systems, WAMS has many geographically disperse
resources with limited physical protection, which leaves them more vulnerable to physical
tampering. Moreover, WAMS has strict real-time requirements that make many security
mechanisms unacceptable due to its overhead on the communication network. Therefore,
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systems with real-time requirements often cannot adopt many security controls.
In summary, merging new communication technologies such as WAMS in future smart
grid exposes the grid to many unfamiliar security problems. Such problems are imported
from the communication networks in addition to new threats due to the grid nature. In
general, the main security risks for WAMS are resources and information availability, data
integrity, and data confidentiality. Therefore, in this research, we study the security threats
regarding information availability and its impact on the grid’s performance. The succeeding
sections present our objectives and the thesis contributions.
1.4 Research Objectives
Securing the communication network of WAMS is still an active research. WAMS sys-
tem might be a target to cyber-attacks or communication network failure that impact the
phasor measurements (i.e., delays, packet drop, incomplete measurements, etc.). There-
fore, security aspects are extremely important in WAMS as measurements are used for
real-time grid supervision, control, and protection. Any altering of measurements may
trigger wrong control decisions that might endanger the grid’s operations.
Under this setting, the availability, security, and resiliency of the WAMS and the data it
carries become crucial to the normal operations of the smart grid. As mentioned previously,
the main security goals of a WAMS are to ensure the availability, integrity, and confiden-
tiality of the measurements and the underlying computing and communicating network.
Moreover, the data security should be ensured end to end, that is, from the time of data
origination at the PMU to the time of use by the control center and/or applications. Se-
curity mechanisms solution should not introduce too much additional delay when sending
and receiving synchrophasor measurements. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand
WAMS communication network and the underlying cyber-physical impacts as well as at-




This thesis will mainly focus on the relation between WAMS security and IP routing
protocol. Mainly, we focus our attention on three fundamental problems. These problems
are summarized next and presented in details in dedicated chapters of this thesis.
 First, the increased deployment of synchrophasor technologies increases the effective
attack surface available to attackers and exposes WAMS applications. Such applica-
tions have strict and stringent delay requirements, e.g., end to end delay as well as
delay variation between measurements from different PMUs. We consider delays on
the communication networks due to cyber-attacks, which have a negative impact on
the transferred measurements causing delays and packet drops, which in turn will im-
pact the applications that rely on the transferred synchrophasors. We present a math-
ematical model for constructing forwarding trees for PMUs measurements which
satisfy the end-to-end delay as well as the delay variation requirements of WAMS
applications at data concentrators. We illustrate that simple shortest path routing will
result in a larger fraction of data drop and that our method will always guarantee to
find a suitable solution. An important goal of this research is to study and character-
ize the impact of the availability attack on WAMS. To this extent, we use a real-time
co-simulation by integrating a communication network simulator (OPNET [18]) with
a power grid simulator (Opal-RT/Hypersim [19]). Such co-simulator is integrated,
synchronized and equipped with communication capabilities to allow the simulated
voltage and current data to flow to PMUs, which allows us to characterize the impact
of availability attack.
 Second, we investigate the security of WAMS from a prevention standpoint. As
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mentioned earlier, the increased integration of PMUs introduces new vulnerabilities
to cyber-attacks, which if exploited by attackers, may have damaging consequences
ranging from a local power outage to complete blackout [20, 21]. For instance, [22]
showed that a potential network intrusion may cause severe damages, such as cascad-
ing failures and massive blackouts similar to the 2003 North-American blackout [5].
Therefore, several algorithms have been proposed to detect the presence of such at-
tacks [23–25]. With detection, actions must be considered to prevent the propagation
of cyber-attacks, which is the aim of this thread. Therefore, we propose an opti-
mal IP Multicast tree construction for each connected PMU. Each tree connects the
PMU to its set of destinations (PDC, SPDC, data historian, etc.) with the objective
of minimizing the likelihood of cyber-attacks propagation while satisfying real-time
requirements.
 Finally, we aim at developing a control scheme to compensate for the impact of com-
munication network delays on WAMS applications. The timely collection of phasors
from PMUs dispersed across the grid allows to maintain system observability and
take corrective actions when needed. This collection is made possible through Pha-
sor Data Concentrators (PDCs) that time-align and aggregate phasor measurements,
and forward the resulting stream to be used by monitoring and control applications.
Cyber-attacks resulting in the disconnection of PDC(s) from WAMS initiate a loss of
its phasor stream and incompleteness in the observability of the power system. We
formulate a recovery strategy from loss of PDC(s) in the WAMS network based on
the re-routing of disconnected PMUs to functional PDCs. The presented approach
is mathematically formulated as a linear program taking into consideration the func-
tionality requirements of the WAMS network, and the use of PMU measurements
in the system observability. The approach is tested on standard IEEE test systems.
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We compare the collected results with other approaches from the literature. The col-
lected results demonstrate the effectiveness of the presented model in restoring the
system observability after a PDC failure due to cyber-attacks.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 represents a background on WAMS and its
components along with a literature review regarding WAMS security. Chapter 3 addresses
the problem of delay attack, a mathematical model for PMU data collection is presented and
evaluated with different IEEE test systems. The impact of delay attack and an evaluation
using a real-time co-simulator is presented in this chapter as well. Chapter 4 presents the
problem of cyber-attack propagation and its relation with IP-multicast routing protocol.
A mathematical formulation of multicast trees that minimize the propagation of cyber-
attack then evaluated using an IEEE test system is presented in this chapter. In Chapter
5, a recovery scheme for disconnected PDC (after an attack) to restore connectivity with
disconnected PMUs and recover their synchrophasor measurements. Finally, A summary
of the work reported in this thesis is given in Chapter 6.
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2. Background and Literature Survey
2.1 WAMS
Wide Area Measurement Systems were defined by Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA) in the late 1980s. In 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) started the Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS)
Project. WAMS can be defined as ”a system that takes measurements in the power grid at
a high granularity, over a wide area and across traditional control boundaries and then uses
those measurements to improve grid stability through wide-area situational awareness and
advanced analysis” [26]. This can be achieved throughout the collection of measurement
values, displayed and processed by human operators and/or control-center applications,
from widely distributed sensors. A common type of sensors is the Phasor Measurement
Unit (PMU) developed in the early 1980s. PMUs provide a time-stamped voltage and
current phasors by utilizing the Global Positioning System (GPS) clock with a sampling
rate that ranges from 30 samples per second up to 120 samples per second. These time-
stamped measurements are then transmitted to a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC). The
role of a PDC is to aggregate and correlate the time-stamped measurements from different
PMUs, then sends the correlated measurements to a Super PDC at the control center as
shown in Figure (2.1). PMU measurements play an important role in smart grid operations.
The interest in synchrophasor technology has received a great deal of attention in recent

































Figure 2.1: Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS)
crucial elements in enhancing the grids performance and resilience to catastrophic failures.
WAMS evolution has made the monitoring of the dynamics of power systems in real-
time a promising aspect to enhance and maintain systems stability under stressed operation
conditions. Such system is capable of providing a dynamic snapshot of the systems states
in real-time and updates it every 20 ms. Having such a precise understanding of the oper-
ation conditions contributes significantly to achieving much improved performance levels
of power systems.
2.1.1 Benefits of WAMS
The most benefits of WAMS technologies are described as follows:
 Improve the grid’s reliability by enhancing situational awareness and advanced appli-
cations. For example, WAMS applications can provide early and improved detection
of any evolving problems in the grid and allow the system operators to take the re-
quired mitigation measures.
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 Enhanced integration of distributed energy resources. WAMS can be used to monitor
the changes in the grid’s behaviour that might be an impact of integrating renewable
energy resources.
 Better visualization and assistance tools for operators to manage the system.
 Avoiding large area disturbances.
 Increasing power transmission capability with no reduction of system security.
2.2 SCADA
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system is used since the 1970s in the power
grid but nowadays more devices that provide more functions are attached to it. The SCADA
system can be defined as the technology that enables a user to collect data from distant sub-
stations and/or send control commands to those substations. The control center in SCADA
systems performs centralized control and monitoring for field devices, which control lo-
cal operations over long-distance networks. Based on the received information, operator-
driven commands are sent to field devices, which control various operations such as col-
lecting data from sensors, monitoring the local environment for alarms, and open and close
breakers. The architecture of such system is described in the following subsection.
2.2.1 SCADA Systems Architecture
The following is a list of the major components in SCADA systems [27]:
 Operator: a human operator who monitors the system and controls the operation of
the remote plant.
 SCADA Server or Master Terminal Unit (MTU): which is similar to the master unit
in a master/slave architecture. The MTU gathers data from a remote site, presents this
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data to the operator through a human machine interface, and sends control commands
to the remote site.
 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): functions as a slave in the master/slave architecture.
The RTU sends control signals to the device under control such as sensors, acquires
data from these devices, and transmits the collected data to the MTU.
 The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): is a small computer designed to perform
logic functions with the ability to control complex processes. Often they are used as
field devices due to their flexibility, versatility, and economical use over RTUs.
 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED): are smart sensors intelligent enough to acquire
data, communicate with other devices, and perform local control. IED combines
analog input and output, low-level control abilities, memory, and communication
system in one device, allowing automatic control at the local level.
 Human Machine Interface (HMI): is the software and hardware that allows the oper-
ator to monitor the system’s state, modify control settings, and manually override the
automatic control in case of emergency.
These components communicate with each other as shown in Figure 2.2. The control
center contains the MTU or SCADA server and the communications router in addition
to the HMI, workstations, and data historian, all connected by LAN. The control center
collects information from field stations, and then displays them to the HMI; actions will be
generated based on this information [27]. The field devices perform local control of sensors
and actuators, and each field site is equipped with remote access to allow diagnostic and
maintenance over a WAN connection. The information is transported between the control
center and the field devices using various techniques such as telephone line, satellite, cable,
fibber, and radio frequency.
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Figure 2.2: Power Grid Control System Architecture [2]
SCADA system collects data from remote terminal units at various substations and
relays aggregated measurements to the control center for state estimation. However, various
cyber attacks have been reported on SCADA system, resulting in major blackouts, such
as the August 2003 Northwest blackout. The 2003 blackout [5] highlighted the need to
develop a robust state estimator. Therefore, the integrity of SCADA’s state estimation is
under threat due to transforming the current power grid to a smarter power grid. This
transformation opens the grid to the outside networks through the use of IP-based protocols
in the communication system, which could bring complex collaborating attacks. In [28],
Liu et al. showed that a new false data injection attack is able to evade bad data detection
in today’s SCADA system and then introduce an arbitrary error to the state estimation. A
recent study in [29] showed that false data injection attacks can cause the state-of-the-art
EMS/SCADA state estimator to manipulate more than 50 % of the values without triggering
the bad data detection alarm.
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2.2.2 WAMS Vs. SCADA
Conventional communication infrastructure, such as SCADA system has limited con-
trol and real-time capabilities compared to WAMS. Typically, SCADA provides, at a low
transmission rate, uncoordinated and not-fully synchronized system data that does not cap-
ture the state of the system at a given moment in time. Rather, the data can provide a good
estimate of the system state assuming that the system is in a quasi-steady state. Moreover,
such systems may not be able to dynamically monitor the power flow due to the fact that
they are based on steady-state power flow. In addition, the time tags of SCADA measure-
ments are not accurate since the clock used in the time tag process is local clocks, which
makes it difficult to compare measurements obtained from two different measuring devices.
Consequently, SCADA measurements are not suitable for the grid’s dynamic monitoring.
On the other hand, The measurement rates of PMU are much higher than the rates of
SCADA and thus, more suitable for grid dynamics monitoring. Currently, PMUs with re-
porting rates up to 120 frames/s are mostly available in the commercial markets. Therefore,
WAMS emerged as an enhanced measurement technology that complements SCADA by
providing a real-time snapshot of the grid dynamics.
2.3 WAMS Components
In general, WAMS has four basic components: PMUs, PDCs, applications that rely on
phasor measurements, and a communication network to connect PMUs and PDCs. In the
following subsequent sections, each component is described in details.
2.3.1 Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)
Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) have been increasingly deployed over the past decade
as a leading measurement technology for the smart grid transmission system, which opened
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Figure 2.3: Collection of Synchrophasor Data [3]
opportunities to utilize new applications and enhance the grid operations. PMUs measure
voltage, current, and frequency at specific locations in the grid as shown in Figures (2.3,
2.4). Voltage and current parameters represent the delivery of electricity from generation
to consumers, while frequency is the key indicator of the stability between generation and
consumption. PMUs typically sample measurements at a rate of several hundred measure-
ments per second and use this data to calculate the phasor value. A phasor is “a complex
number that represents the magnitude and phase angle of the sinusoidal waveforms of volt-
age or current at a specific point in time” [3]. PMUs include upgraded relay and digital
fault recorders (DFRs) that normally capture data during an event such as system fault,
equipment failure, or generator tripping.
Synchrophasor is a term used to describe a phasor which has been estimated at an in-
stant known as the time tag of the synchrophasor. In order to obtain simultaneous measure-
ment of phasors across wide area of the power system, it is necessary to synchronize these
time tags, so that all phasor measurements belonging to the same time tag are truly simul-
taneous. Synchrophasors are basically phasors synchronized to an accurate time source.
PMUs are synchronized to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) time, which is a widely
used international time standard. The UTC time can be obtained through GPS system,
which is a constellation of satellites transmitting signals to the users. The GPS system was
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Figure 2.4: Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) PMU
Figure 2.5: Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) PDC
built by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make navigation easy with the objective
of broadcasting precise time and location information.
2.3.2 Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC)
A PDC as defined in [4] is ”a node in a communication network where synchrophasor
data from a number of PMUs or PDCs is processed and fed out as a single stream to the
higher level PDCs and/or applications” see Figure 2.5. The PDC groups measurements
from different PMUs with the same timestamp into a time-stamped buffer. A new time-
stamped buffer is initiated every time the PDC receives phasor measurements with a new
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timestamp. When the buffer is full, the PDC forwards the set of measurements to other
PDCs and/or Synchrophasor applications. In general, WAMS might suffer from commu-
nication delays due to intentional cyber attacks or unintentional communication failures.
Hence, the PDC may have to wait for the delayed measurements for its buffer to be full
before forwarding the measurements to the applications; this might violate real-time re-
quirements of some applications. A slight modification to this approach has been made
where a timer per time-stamped buffer has been added. This timer is the amount of time
the buffer is actively waiting for the rest of synchrophasor measurements with the same
timestamp. The countdown of the timer starts when the first measurement with a new time
stamp arrives at the PDC. Then, the PDC assigns a new buffer to this newly arrived mea-
surement and starts the timer. When the timer goes off, the PDC forwards the received
measurements without waiting for the entire measurements to arrive. In case of delays, this
wait time ensures that the PDC forwards the phasor measurements in an acceptable time
range without waiting for the delayed measurements to arrive. However, this timer intro-
duces the issue of data incompleteness when synchrophasor measurements arriving after
the expiration of the PDC timer are dropped at the PDC [30].
A PDC can be found as a stand-alone device or as a function integrated into other
systems. According to [4], a PDC can support more than fifteen functions some of them
are explained below:
 Data aggregation: this function can be done with or without time alignment. Aggre-
gation with time alignment means that the PDC waits for data from different PMUs or
PDCs with the same timestamp then place them in one packet and transfer the packet
to a higher level PDC or to an application. On the other hand, aggregation without
time alignment refers to periodically transferring synchrophasors with a user-settable
transmission interval or data size.
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 Data forwarding: this function is performed without data aggregation as PDCs for-
ward data from one input to one or more outputs. Such functionality helps in mini-
mizing PDC latency as some applications require minimum latency.
 Data communications: a PDC is able to communicate with other devices such as
PMUs or other PDCs using serial and/or Ethernet networks.
 Data validation: basic data validation may be performed in a PDC by performing
time quality, data integrity, and other checks. PDCs may detect and flag any corrupt
data before sending it out.
 Data latency calculation: a PDC can calculate and communicates data latency as
synchrophasors arrive at the PDC and allow statistical computations for additional
latency analysis for assessment of the network performance.
 Output data buffering: in case of communication interruption, a PDC may buffer the
output data to minimize the data loss then resends it to the destination after restoring
the communication.
 Performance Monitoring: to monitor the quality of transferred data with other de-
vices.
 Duplicate data handling: discarding all duplicate data that arrives at the PDC from
different data streams or different communication paths.
 Cyber security: even though cyber security is generally controlled by the application,
PDCs should be able to evaluate their security, which goes beyond simply securing




The communication network plays an important role in the overall performance and
functionality of WAMS. It should ensure that synchrophasor measurements are transferred
among the required Quality of Service (QoS) of each application. Such network transfer
different synchrophasor measurements, which includes phasors, frequency, rate-of-change-
of-frequency, analog values, digital values, and status information. The transferred data
typically follows a client-server based where a client PDC sends a data request command
to a server PMU or other PDC, then the PMU responds with the required data. An IP
unicast or multicast data transfer protocol can be used for streaming data between PMUs
and PDCs depending on how the network is built.
The multicast function allows an efficient data distribution in the communication net-
work. If a source PMU is sending to multiple destination PDCs, it simply uses a multicast
address in the destination field. The synchrophasor packet is then duplicated in the net-
work only as needed to prevent unnecessary bandwidth consumption. However, multicast
communication introduced complexity to the network. A multicast routing is needed to
establish multicast trees from PMUs to PDCs.
Reliability, security, and efficiency are important criteria of WAMS communication
network. Delays in time-critical networks such as WAMS can affect WAMS real-time
applications; hence, the grid’s performance and stability. Such delay depends on many
factors such as network bandwidth, propagation delay, communication medium, etc. Many
communication mediums have been considered such as telephone line, satellite, power line
communication (PLC), Microwave links, Fibre optic cables. The latest is considered the
most attractive medium for WAMS communications as it provides long distance transmis-
sions, low latency, and large bandwidth.
Other than a communication medium, PMUs need to use communication protocol to
transfer synchrophasor measurements to destination PDCs. Channel capacity and latency
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are an important performance-related feature in a communication medium.
Different protocols have been proposed and continue to evolve. These include some
custom protocols (e.g., BPA/PDCstream), IEEE Std 1344-1995 (discouraged), IEEE Std
C37.118-2005, IEEE Std C37.118.2-2011, and IEC 61850-90-5 protocols. Currently, the
most common used standards are the IEEE Std C37.118.2-2011 and the IEC 61850-90-5.
(1) IEEE Standard C37.118: in 2005, IEEE Standard C37.118-2005 was introduced. It
replaces the pervious synchrophasor standard 1344-1995 and provides a synchropha-
sor definition, compliance testing methods, and message formats to communicate
with a PMU. Then, in 2011, two new synchrophasor standards have been introduced
and replaced the C37.118-2005. The first standard (C37.118.1-2011) addresses the
measurement aspect of PMUs while the second standard (C37.118.2-2011) addresses
synchrophasor communications. The latest, defines message types, message formats,
and message contents to facilitate real-time synchrophasor communication between
PMUs and PDCs. Four types of messages have been defined as follows:
 Data frame: contains measurements estimated by PMUs.
 Configuration frame: contains machine readable information
 Header frame: contains human readable information.
 Command frame: contains machine readable information such as appropriate
actions to be taken.
(2) IEC 61850-90-5: provides protocol for exchanging synchrophasor information be-
tween PMUs and wide area monitoring and control applications.
(3) IEEE C37.244-2013: describes the functional requirements of PDCs.
A high speed and intelligent communication infrastructure is the key to make time-
critical WAMS applications feasible in practice.
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2.3.4 WAMS Applications
Synchrophasor measurements are used to support many applications, ranging from vi-
sualization of information and alarms for situational awareness, to applications that pro-
vide sophisticated analytical, control, or protection functionalities. Applications, such as
dynamics monitoring, use full-resolution, real-time data along with the grid models to sup-
port both operating and planning functions. The application(s) locally display measured
frequencies, primary voltages, currents, real and reactive power flows, and other quantities
for system operators. Synchrophasor applications have been widely discussed as a possible
way to promote smart grid operations to a more efficient and responsive level [30]. There-
fore, to realize the full potential of synchrophasor technologies, advanced applications that
improve the grid monitoring, control, and protection are needed [3]. Such applications re-
quire more PMUs to be installed at different parts of the grid. For instance, under the U.S
Department of Energy’s smart grid initiative, several thousand PMUs are being scheduled
to be installed in the coming few years [13].
This increased deployment of PMUs will increase the volume of transferred data per
second. Moreover, the effectiveness of these synchrophasor measurements is subject to
communication timing guarantees. As a result, utility companies and independent sys-
tem operators are trying to understand how to efficiently process and utilize the gigantic
volumes of real-time phasors. Hence, the current centralized WAMS architecture will no
longer be sustainable under such data explosion, and a completely distributed architecture
needs to be developed as a natural choice [31].
Under distributed WAMS, synchropasor applications are implemented in a distributed
fashion on multiple PDCs. Such applications, put stringent time requirements in terms of
data delays in comparison to the conventional SCADA systems; Table 2.1 shows different
synchrophasor applications. In addition, these applications require phasor measurements
from distributed PMUs to be sent to the corresponding PDCs in a synchronous fashion in
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Table 2.1: Synchrophaor Applications
Application Online/Offline Class Local/Wide Purpose Sampling rate Latency
Wide-Area Monitoring and Visualization Online Class C Wide area Monitoring 30 samples/second NA
Oscillation Detection Online NA Local/Wide area Control 30 samples/second 200 ms
Frequency Stability Monitoring Online Class C NA Monitoring 30 samples/second 2-4 se
Voltage Stability Monitoring Online Class C Wide area Monitoring 30 samples/second 1 sec
State Estimation Online Class B NA Monitoring/Control 30 samples/second Less than 100 ms
Islanding and Restoration Online NA Wide area Control 30 samples/second 50 msec
Post-Event Analysis Offline Class D NA Monitoring NA NA
real-time [32]. Each PDC receives phasor measurements from a set of PMUs distributed
in different parts of the grid with varying distances, which can impact the required time
for sending their phasor measurements. Moreover, the shared IP network that sends the
phasor measurements to PDCs provides services to other sensors such as Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs) and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), a video for surveillance purpose,
and Voice over IP applications [33]. Moreover, based on [34], network delays in WAMS
communication have a negative impact on the grid performance especially on closed-loop
power system performance.
In summary, as PMUs are being increasingly deployed, it is crucial for WAMS to
transfer the phasor measurements from different PMUs to their destinations (PDC, SPDC,
synchrophasor applications) in a secure, efficient, and timely manner. A PDC receives
synchrophasor measurements from one or more PMU through a data communication net-
work (e.g. wireless or wired IP-based network) as presented in the NASPInet architec-
ture [35]. Generally, WAMS requires a high-speed and intelligent communication net-
work to collect synchronized measurements from distributed PMUs. Thus, power line
and microwave communication were proposed earlier as WAMS communication technolo-
gies; however, these technologies have their limitations regarding reliability, scalability,
and robustness [36]. Therefore, optical fiber communication that allows low latency, high
bandwidth, and low loss attracted WAMS applications to transmit data from PMUs to
PDCs [21]. Currently, PMUs transmit their measurements to a pre-defined set of PDCs in
24
a hierarchical manner using IP Unicast network transmission [37]. However, with the in-
creasing deployment of PMUs and PDCs along with the rising number of applications that
rely on PMU measurements, the existing configuration suffers from several drawbacks such
as message delays, limited latency and throughput, and limited scalability [38]. Therefore,
a new configuration, e.g. IP Multicast, is needed to meet the new requirements [39–42].
This configuration addresses the fact that PMUs are classical multicast sources since each
PMU sends a continuous data stream to a number of destinations (i.e., PDCs, Super PDCs,
data historian, etc.). Thus, it is more reasonable to consider IP Multicast protocols for
carrying PMU measurements; IP multicast minimizes packet replication and thus is more
bandwidth efficient.
2.4 Literature Survey
2.4.1 False Data Injection Attack
Attacks targeting the smart grid critical processes, such as state estimation, have at-
tracted lately an increasing attention in the research community. Until recently, it was as-
sumed that the system state estimation is immune to cyber attacks. However, a recent work
by Liu et al. [28] demonstrates that in the presence of an intelligent attacker equipped with
the knowledge about the grid topology, false data can be injected into sensor measurements
to introduce an arbitrary change in the estimated states without being detected. This new
class of attacks is called False Data Injection (FDI) attack. Due to the ability of the attacker
to change the system state without being detected, an increasing effort has been directed
toward the detection of such an attack. In [23], protecting a set of carefully selected sensor
measurements by, for example, guards or video monitoring, is proposed as a countermea-
sure against FDI attacks. However, selecting the set of measurements to be protected is
an NP-hard problem [43]; thus, recent studies have proposed various methods to select the
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set of sensor measurements for protection. The authors of [24] developed a greedy algo-
rithm to obtain the optimal set of sensor measurements that need to be protected to evade
cyber-attacks. In [43], a graphical method has been developed to optimally select the set of
sensor measurements to be protected in order to defend against cyber-attacks. The authors
in [25] present a generalized likelihood ratio test to implement a detection algorithm for
cyber-attacks targeting the state estimation. In [20], a detection and identification approach
has been proposed to detect cyber-attacks in PMUs using the Expectation-Maximization
algorithm. After detection, appropriate measures need to be taken to avoid the propagation
of cyber-attacks.
Next, we present a literature review of different proposed approaches that aim at con-
structing an FDI attack under different circumstances such as the knowledge of the attacker
or his limited resources. As we have mentioned previously, the work by Yao et al. that
addressed the FDI attack assumed that the attacker had full access to the Jacobian matrix
H , which represents the network topology of the power grid. Moreover, it assumed that
the attacker had the ability to physically tamper with a specific number of sensors and
manipulates their measurements. However, [44] presented a formal model for state estima-
tion verification while considering different attack attributes such as specific target, limited
capability, etc. In contrast, [24] proposed a unified formulation to construct the optimal
attack vector a, using a minimum number of manipulated measurements, by developing a
low complexity attack strategy that outperforms the naive `1 relaxation. However, this ap-
proach required a relaxation of the constraints on the basic problem statement. Thus, [45]
proposed a graph-theoretic algorithm that presented the optimal solution to the optimal
attack vector without any relaxation.
Moreover, the current research direction has been shifted to consider different scenarios,
where the attacker either has partial or zero knowledge of the network topology. In [46],
the authors proved that an FDI attack can be constructed even when the attacker has no
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knowledge of the system topological information. In this case, the attack can be launched
only if the measurement placement has a special structure such as bridging edges. On the
other hand, when this special structure is not available, the attacker needs to have partial
knowledge about the network topology to be able to launch an undetectable FDI attack.
In [47], they studied the ability of the attacker to construct an attack vector with limited
knowledge about the network topology. Moreover, [48] proposed an approach that can
exploit the subspace structure of the system measurements in the case where the attacker
has limited knowledge about the network topology.
The majority of research is considering the DC power flow model due to its simplicity
and ability to derive the exact solution in most cases. Another reason behind the wide use
of the DC model is that AC state estimation is more complicated, due to several differences.
First, AC power flow solutions are usually obtained through iteration, whereas in DC model
they are generally obtained in closed-form. Second, DC power flow state estimation is
based on active power flow, while the AC model is based on both active and reactive power
flow. Third, the DC model’s state variables consider voltage phase angles, but the AC
model considers both voltage phase angles and voltage phase magnitude as states.
However, the AC power flow model is widely used in the power grid; thus, recent
researches have considered AC state estimation [49] [50]. The ability to construct an FDI
attack against power system state estimation when it uses the more practical AC model has
been examined in [50], where the attacker is required to collect some online data during
the attack implantation. Based on these online data, the attack is divided into two classes:
perfect and imperfect attacks. In a perfect attack, the attacker can accurately obtain the
online data needed for state estimation. In an imperfect attack, the attacker may obtain
online data with errors. An analytical mechanism for vulnerability assessment of AC state
estimation was proposed in [49], where the use of the system physical propreties can help
the grid operator to mitigate FDI attacks. From the attacker’s perspective, an algorithm
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based on a graph that determines the set of measurements which need to be compromised
in order to minimize the effort of the attacker has been proposed [49].
Using AC power flow state estimation provides advantages to the system operator if the
attacker does not have the knowledge of the system configuration; otherwise, the attacker
will be able to launch an FDI without being detected.
The problem of finding the smallest number of measurements the attacker needs to
compromise has been proved to be an NP-hard problem [24]. In [51], Yang et al. trans-
formed the NP-hard problem to the Minimum Subadditive Join problem, which is NP-hard
as well.
In the following subsections, we describe the problem of finding the optimal set of
measurements to be protected, followed by a literature review on the current proposed
approaches.
(1) Secure Measurements
The conventional method to defend against FDI attack is by securing a set of mea-
surements to evade malicious injections, either by use of guards, video monitoring, or
a tamper-proof communication system. This may acquire additional fees for instal-
lation and maintenance in large power grids. Many approaches have been proposed
to tackle the problem of finding the optimal protection set of measurements while
minimizing the cost at the same time. In [23], the authors explored the ability of
the operator to verify the values of the selected state variables, which provides in-
direct protection for the sensor measurements that most affect the value of the state
variables.
The authors of [52] addressed this issue and proposed a sequential method to find a
minimum set of protected measurements for the protection of any set of state vari-
ables. However, the enumeration-based method is of very high complexity in large-
scale power systems. Therefore, it is essential to develop a method that can protect a
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set of state variables that have a greater social/economic impact once compromised.
The authors of [53] proposed the use of PMUs as well to provide direct voltage mea-
surements at specific buses to mitigate FDI. In [54], the authors showed that no un-
detectable attack can be launched if the power grid is observable from the protected
set of measurements.
(2) Secure Transmission Lines
Another approach which has recently emerged to defend against FDI attack is to
limit the attacker’s knowledge of the network topological information by changing
some software/hardware parameters, such as transformer taps in transmission lines.
This protection method has a lower operation cost in comparison to protecting a set
of measurements. However, not all transmission lines can be covert, such as lines
missing transforms taps and breakers.
It was shown in [55] that intentional topology disturbance may enable the grid oper-
ator to detect an FDI attack using a traditional Bad Data Detection (BDD) residual
test. However, a random topology disturbance may not dissolve the possibility of
an undetectable FDI attack. The work of [56], which is an early version of [46],
limits the attacker’s knowledge of the network topology by protecting the informa-
tion of a minimum number of transmission lines. Where the solution of the optimal
protection problem can be obtained by solving a Steiner tree problem where many
well-investigated algorithms can be used [56]. As we have mentioned earlier, not all
transmission lines can be kept covert. Therefore, a mixed defense strategy, that con-
siders both the proposed covert topology and the protection of a set of measurements,
is proposed when the information about the transmission line cannot be covert. In
this case, the mixed defending strategy can be done by solving the optimal mea-
surements protection after converting available covert transmission lines into a flow
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measurements [57].
The work of [46] proposed the use of Covert Topological Information (CTI) to limit
the attacker’s knowledge about the network topology such that no undetectable FDI
attack could be launched. Furthermore, a mixed defending strategy similar to [56]
has been proposed where in [46], the authors extended the method in [56, 57] by
considering a general case with varying cost to protect each actual measurement. A
positive weight to each edge in the graph is added based on the difficulty of protecting
the measurement it is mapped to. Hence, the problem becomes similar to solving a
Steiner tree with a minimum edge weight sum. Finally, the optimal mixed defense
strategy can be obtained by solving the equivalent secure meter selection problem
[57].
In [47], the attacker can launch an undetectable FDI attack when he has limited but
structured topological information. Therefore, the grid operator needs to make a wise
decision on which part of the topological information needs to be covert, while the
rest can be revealed to the public.
Moreover, multiple false data attack detection algorithms have been proposed, mainly
with a focus on maximizing the detection probability and attack damage control. In a
study at coordinated data injection [54], a Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) was
proposed to detect and localize an attack in which the attacker utilizes a graph-theoretic
approach. Signal processing and machine learning are also used in the detection of FDI
attacks [58]. Another approach [59] formulated the detection problem as a low-rank ma-
trix recovery and completion problem and then solved it using convex optimization. In
this approach, the authors’ main contribution is considering time series measurements in
the detection problem, which is different from other approaches that focus on single time
measurements. Formulating the problem of detecting FDI as a metric separation problem
has been proposed in [60]. Using distributed state estimation to detect an FDI attack has
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been proposed in [61, 62], in which the power system is divided into many subsystems
using clustering algorithms. Then a Chi-squares test is used in each subsystem to detect
an FDI attack, and if detected the result works as a guide for the graph update. Finally,
a decentralized detection approach is designed based on a Markov graph of bus phase an-
gles [63]. This approach is based on the insight that under normal operation the Markov
graph matches the power grid graph; otherwise, the system is under attack and an alert
should be triggered.
Other research deploys current IDS [64, 65], such as behavior-based [66] and bloom-
filter-based [64], which monitor the abnormal behavior using predefined rules to detect the
attack.
2.4.2 Multicast Tree Construction
The problem of constructing multicast trees has received considerable attention in the
past. Such tree construction has been considered in different networks such as ad-hoc net-
works, mesh networks, and wireless sensor networks. In [67], a multicast tree construction
for wireless ad-hoc network is proposed; however, such networks are different than the
smart grid in the sense that such network requires a flexible and efficient routing due to the
dramatic changes in the network topology and limited bandwidth. In [68], the multicast
tree construction is formulated as one of computing a directed Steiner tree of minimal cost.
Such solution can be beneficial to applications in which a tree is used repeatedly for sev-
eral large-volume transactions and where the user is desirous of bounding the cost whatever
the nature of the network, such as on-demand video services, news distribution, and stock
distributions. In [69], a multicast tree that meets the quality of service requirements of
real-time interactive applications operating in a high-speed packet switch environment has
been proposed.
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Moreover, the problem of routing multicast traffic with real-time constraints has been stud-
ied in [70], and heuristics to compute low-cost trees which guarantee an upper bound on
the end-to-end delay have been developed. For a survey and extensive simulation study of
a large number of existing multicast algorithms and an evaluation of their performance in
high-speed environments, the reader is referred to [71]. Moreover, QoS-based and security-
based routing scheme for smart grid communications has been investigated to meet smart
grid applications requirements. In [72], a detailed multicast routing implementation is pro-
posed for smart grid voltage control. Routing is formulated as an optimization problem
assuming a simplified model of the physical system and heuristic solution approaches are
applied. In [73], the authors propose a hybrid structure routing architecture to enable the
resilience, robustness, and efficiency of the smart grid. This routing protocol is based on
distributed optimization of the QoS along individual routing paths. In [74], the authors con-
struct QoS multicast tree to deliver control messages from the controller to a set of remote
devices while minimizing the end-to-end delay. In [30], an analysis of the communication
network for WAMS applications with a focus on end-to-end delay is presented. The aim of
such analysis is to quantify the end-to-end delay given a specific communication network
(envisioned design for the Swedish transmission grid). In [75], the authors proposed a
flocking-based multicast routing for the smart grid with efficient situational-awareness for
network traffic. The aim is to balance the end-to-end delay and bandwidth for WAMS com-
munication. However, considering the time variation between the arrival of synchrophasor
measurements; hence, the PDC timer in the tree construction has not been addressed.
2.4.3 Attacks Targeting PMUs
Recently, increasing efforts have been devoted to understanding cyber attacks targeting
PMUs. In [76], the authors study a GPS spoofing attack, targeting the measurement system,
where the attacker sends a forged GPS signal in order to cause variation in the measured
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PMU phasors. Such an attack has no available defense mechanism, which threatens critical
applications that rely on PMU measurements as presented in [77]. Moreover, PMU data
spoofing, denial of service and WAMS communication links damage are studied in [21],
where a co-simulation platform is developed to assess the impact of such attacks on the
power grid.
2.4.4 The Impact of Delay and Data Incompleteness
The impact of data incompleteness has been addressed recently in [78], where the im-
pact of network delay on the incompleteness of the data was studied and a trade-off between
delay and data incompleteness with different PDC timer setup was presented. In [79], the
impact of the network delay and data incompleteness in WAMS has been studied. The
authors in [34], developed a control scheme to compensate the network effects in WAMS
such as induced network delays, packet disordering, and data packet drops. In [80], the
impact of data incompleteness on the system state estimation due to cyber-attack has been
addressed. Moreover, several studies have considered the problem of stability of power
systems with time delays [81, 82]. Congestion (intentional or not) along the communica-
tion links may result in constant/random packet delays. As a result, queue lengths become
very large, buffers overflow, packets get delayed or dropped, resulting in incomplete infor-
mation at the application side [83]. These issues lower the data quality and can even impact
the performance of WAMS applications
2.4.5 Cyber-attack Propagation
Propagation of attacks on shared communication network is studied in [37,84]. Cyber-
attacks in open grid environment are addressed in [85], and a Mixed Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (MILP) optimization model to avoid the attack propagation is proposed. In the
context of PMUs network, Mousavian et al. propose in [37] a probabilistic mitigation
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model to find an optimal response to cyber attacks. A so-called threat level, the probability
of a PMU to be contaminated through a compromised PMU, is calculated. Then a MILP
response model is formulated to minimize the threat level of all connected PMUs at a cer-
tain time by disabling PMUs that are likely to be compromised. However, such model does
not consider the interaction between the routing in IP multicast and the attack propagation;
such interaction is addressed in this report.
2.4.6 Attacks Targeting PDC
Cyber-attacks targeting PMUs and their impact on the grid’s operations has received
much interest from the research community recently [86–88]. However, little work has
focused on attacking PDCs and its impact on WAMS applications. In general, when a PDC
is identified as compromised and disconnected from the communication network, more se-
vere consequences can occur in comparison with attacking a PMU. On one hand, when a
PMU is detected to be under attack, to prevent the propagation of the attack the compro-
mised PMU will be disconnected from the network, which means losing its measurements.
On the other hand, attacking and disconnecting a PDC means losing all measurements sent
to that PDC even though the reporting PMUs might not be compromised and can still send
trusted synchrophasor measurements. Therefore, to minimize the impact of cyber-attacks
(disconnecting a compromised PDC), measurements from trusted PMUs need to be re-
routed to other connected PDCs immediately, instead of waiting for the compromised PDC
to be fixed.
To restore the services of PMUs that were lost because of disconnecting a compromised
PDC, [89] proposed a two stage self-healing mechanism to connect trusted PMUs with
un-compromised PDCs in order to restore the observability of the power system while
minimizing the latency to configure the network. Several constraints have been considered
in this approach during the re-connection process such as hardware resources capacities
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in both communication and transmission network e.g., the size of the forwarding table
and the connection space of PDCs. However, an important feature of the PDC has not been
considered, the so called PDC timer. A timer is a time at which a PDC is actively waiting for
measurements with a certain time stamp to arrive. When the timer goes off, the PDC drops
delayed measurements that arrive after the expiration of the timer. Such a feature should
be considered in the rerouting process of measurements from un-compromised PMUs to
other connected PDCs to avoid rerouting measurements to a PDC that has an expired timer.
Moreover, rerouting a measurement to a PDC that arrive earlier than original measurements
sending to that PDC can invoke the timer to start earlier which might affect other original
measurements sending to that PDC.
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3. Enhancing WAMS Communication
Network Against Delay Attacks
3.1 Introduction
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) have been increasingly deployed over the past
decade as a leading measurement technology for the smart grid transmission system. Such
deployment has opened opportunities to utilize new applications and enhance the grid oper-
ations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, PMUs provide time-stamped high-resolution measure-
ments of voltage and current phasor, frequency, and phase angle from different parts of the
grid. These time-stamped measurements are then transmitted to a Phasor Data Concentrator
(PDC). The role of the PDC is to aggregate and correlate the time-stamped measurements
from different PMUs, then sends the correlated measurements to a Super PDC at the con-
trol center. This synchrophasor system is used to monitor, control, and protect the power
grid by collecting measurement values, displayed and processed by human operators and/or
applications, from widely dispersed areas.
Synchrophasor applications have been widely discussed as a possible way to promote
smart grid operations to a more efficient and responsive level [30]. Therefore, to realize the
full potential of synchrophasor technologies, advanced applications that improve the grid





















Figure 3.1: Wide Area Measurement System
to be installed at different parts of the grid. For instance, under the U.S department of En-
ergy’s smart grid initiative, several thousands PMUs are being scheduled to be installed in
the coming few years [13]. This increased deployment of PMUs will increase the volume
of transferred data per second. Moreover, the effectiveness of this synchrophasor measure-
ments is subject to communication timing guarantees. As a result, utility companies and
independent system operators are trying to understand how to efficiently process and utilize
the gigantic volumes of real-time phasors. Hence, the current centralized WAMS architec-
ture will no longer be sustainable under such data explosion, and a completely distributed
architecture need to be developed as a natural choice [31].
The increased integration of PMUs introduces new vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks,
which if exploited by attackers, may have damaging consequences ranging from local
power outage to complete blackout. Recently, multiple PMU vulnerabilities have been
reported by Arbiter [90]; these vulnerabilities can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) as iden-
tified in the Arbiter Systems Power Sentinel PMU. Moreover, some PMU vendors such as
the National Instruments PMU (NI Grid Automation System) [91] provides Linux-based
PMUs that can be subject to linux?worm/malware attacks (such as Moose and Darlloz.A).
Many research efforts toward building a secure and reliable distributed WAMS architecture
have been proposed recently [11,92]. For example, the data network management task team
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of North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) developed a reference communica-
tion infrastructure called NASPI network to support synchrophasor delivery and specify
recommended smart grid data delivery requirements including latency and reliability [11].
However, if these technologies are not accompanied with appropriate security enforcement,
they may also create new vulnerabilities in the network, leaving it open to a wide range of
cyber-physical attacks [93]. Therefore, approaches and methods to improve the network
performance against attacks are necessarily needed, which is the purpose of this chapter.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the PDC timer is the amount of time the buffer is actively
waiting for the rest of synchrophasor measurements with the same time stamp. The count-
down of the timer starts when the first measurement with a new time stamp arrives at the
PDC. Then, the PDC assigns a new buffer to this newly arrived measurement and starts
the timer. When the timer goes off, the PDC forwards the received measurements without
waiting for the entire measurements to arrive.
In case of delays, this wait time ensures that the PDC forwards the phasor measure-
ments in an acceptable time range without waiting for the delayed measurements to arrive.
However, this timer introduces the issue of data incompleteness when synchrophasor mea-
surements arriving after the expiration of the PDC timer are dropped at the PDC [30]. In
general, the value of the timer depends on the application that uses those measurements.
For example, control applications have really strict delay requirements; thus, the value of
the timer should be small. However, with monitoring application or post disturbance anal-
ysis applications the value of the timer could vary. Such stringent delay requirements is
needed to achieve one of WAMS main objectives, which is proving real-time monitoring
and control based on synchronized measurements arriving at high sampling rate.
Currently, the shared data network that forwards the phasor measurements to PDCs
provides services to other sensors such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Intelligent
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Electronic Devices (IEDs), a video for surveillance purpose, and Voice over IP applica-
tions [33]. Therefore, this shared network can contribute to larger network latency for a
particular PDC. Figure (3.2) shows a WAMS with multiple PMUs communicating with
different PDCs. In particular, for PDC (n), two PMUs are sending their measurements
through a communication network. Each PMU might experience different network la-
tency; thus, the packet arrival times of both PMUs at the PDC might vary. Synchrophasor
measurements arriving after the expiration of the PDC timer will be dropped leading to a
negative impact on the real-time WAMS applications.
(1) Contribution: this chapter is devoted towards investigating WAMS communication
delays and their impact on WAMS real-time applications. It has been shown that non-
functional properties, such as data delay and packet drops, have a negative impact on
the system functionality [94]. Therefore, with the aforementioned communication
challenges in mind, we propose a way to enhance WAMS performance. We consider
a system with multiple PMUs, each communicating with one or more PDCs, using a
shared data network. Our approach is to develop a robust routing method for gather-
ing measurements from PMUs at PDCs while satisfying the end to end delay as well
as delay variation at the PDC between measurements coming from different PMUs.
In other words, our approach is to minimize the number of invalid or dropped mea-
surements at the PDC, i.e., measurements arriving after the timeout period expired at
the corresponding PDC. We believe therefore there is a strong interplay between the
routing paths (delays along the paths) for gathering the measurements and the value
of timeout period. An oblivious routing method to delay constraints may not deliver
timely measurements at the PDCs and result in data incompleteness affecting several
WAMS applications and ultimately the system observability. Therefore, our focus is
to construct delay-aware measurement gathering paths between PMUs and PDCs to




























Figure 3.2: Synchrophasor System [4]
using a real-time co-simulation platform.
3.2 Problem Description
In this section, we start with a simple example to illustrate the delay and data incom-
pleteness problem. Figure (3.2) shows a WAMS that consists of PMUs communicating
with a PDC through a data network. As mentioned previously, WAMS requires a reliable
and fast communication network to meet the real-time requirements. Therefore, delays on
the transferred measurements due to a communication failure or cyber-attacks are critical
especially for real-time synchrophasor applications (e.g., state estimation and power system
oscillation damping controller). Further, depending on how measurements are routed in the
network, they might experience different delays and hence may arrive after the expiration
of the PDC timer.
As mentioned before, the IP multicast routing addresses the fact that PMUs are clas-
sical multicast sources since each PMU sends a continuous data stream to a number of
destinations (i.e., PDCs, Super PDCs, data historian, etc.). Thus, it is more reasonable to
consider IP Multicast protocols for carrying PMU measurements; IP multicast minimizes
packet replication and thus is more bandwidth efficient. Therefore, the relation between the
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communication delay and the IP routing protocol, which is important for the collections of
synchrophasor measurements, need to be addressed. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, data
incompleteness due to such delays should be minimized, which is the aim of this chapter.
Based on that, we present a tree construction model for gathering PMUs packets with
the objective of minimizing the number of invalid measurements during a PDC timer. It is
to be noted that a shortest tree construction, as will be shown later, may not achieve this
objective. Our tree construction is delay-aware and will ensure that the number of invalid
measurements at PDCs is minimized by properly selecting efficient paths for gathering the
measurements from PMUs.
3.2.1 Problem Definition
Consider a distributed WAMS with a set of PMUs Nu = fu1; :::; ujNujg, a set of PDCs
Nc = fc1; :::; cjNcjg. In addition, we consider a data network that connects PMUs to PDCs.
The system can be abstracted to a directed graphG = (N;E), whereE is a set of edges and
N is a set of nodesN = Nu[Nc[Nr. The notionNr represents a set of routers connecting
PMUs and PDCs where Nr = fr1; : : : ; rjNrjg. Each PDC ci is receiving synchrophasor
measurements from a set of PMUs. Let Sci be the set of PMUs sending their measurements
to PDC ci. Similarly, each PMU ui is sending its measurements to a set of destinations
PDCs Dui .
As we mentioned earlier, each WAMS application has a different delay and data re-
quirements. In the case of network delays, some phasor measurements might arrive at the
PDC after the expiration of the PDC timer and those measurements will be dropped leading
to data incompleteness. A straightforward solution is to increase the value of the timer at
the PDC to receive all the required measurements; however, such a solution might violate
the real-time requirements of some applications that may not tolerate any delay such as
power oscillation damping monitoring.
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For example, power oscillation application has two different modes, the first one is as-
sociated with a single generator or plant against the rest of the power grid are referred to
as local modes. The second one is the inter-area oscillation that appears when a group
of generators in one area are oscillating against a group of generators in another area and
often suffers from poor damping. As WAMS technology allows synchrophasor measure-
ments from remote locations to be available at the control center in a high sampling rate, it
opens the opportunity of using remote signals to design more efficient control applications
such as inter-area power system oscillation damping control. However, such applications
have strict delay requirements and time delay can degrade the system performance and
diminish the effectiveness of the control system; which may result in complete system in-
stability [95, 96]. Therefore, in the case of delays, increasing the value of the PDC timer
to minimize the number of dropped packets at the PDC due to the expiration of this timer
might violate those delay requirements (up to 30 milliseconds for the round trip that is
from the time of measurements up to the time of reaction). Increasing the timer value will
increase the time delay as the time delay between the instant of measurements and the time
of the measurement being available at the damping controller would deteriorate the control
performance of such applications.
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to construct trees and collect phasor measurements
from PMUs while respecting the end-to-end delay (from PMUs to PDC) as well as the delay
variation between measurements coming from different PMUs. Such solution, if found,
will maximize the number of valid synchrophasor measurements per PDC timer, which
will be significant to applications relying on these measurements. Further, in presence
of cyber attacks deliberately increasing the delay on some links along some paths in the
forwarding trees, our method can reconstruct the forwarding trees to avoid such links and
therefore enhance the system performance against such attacks.
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3.3 The Mathematical Model
In this section, we present the proposed tree construction model to connect PMUs and
PDCs. Let Cij be the capacity of the communication link (i; j), fuij be the flow from PMU
u on edge (i; j), uc be the end-to-end delay from PMU u to PDC c (which depends on the
total flow on each link), and Th be the end-to-end delay threshold (which depends on the
WAMS applications). Let xuij be a binary variable such that:
xuij =
8>><>>:
1 if edge (i; j) is in u’s tree
0 otherwise
Let yucij be a binary variable such that:
yucij =
8>><>>:
1 if the path to c from u traverses edge (i; j)
0 otherwise
As mentioned previously, our objective function is to maximize the number of received
“valid” measurements within a PDC timer. Let uic be a binary variable equal to
uic =
8>><>>:
0 if measurement ui is valid
1 otherwise
A measurement ui is valid if its end-to-end delay (from the source PMU to the desti-
nation PDC) is less than a specified threshold (Th), and if it arrives at the PDC within an
acceptable time window (defined by the timer which is initiated when a PMU measurement
with new time stamp arrives first, see Figure (3.3)); this can be translated mathematically
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as follows:
uic  Th (3.1)
uic  uc + tout (3.2)
where tout is the PDC timer, and uc is the delay of the first received measurements
with a new time stamp. In other words, uc = min(uc). Knowing the time of the first
received measurements and the timer length for a PDC is useful for calculating the number
of received measurements within a timeout period as described in equation (3.2). To write
this (min expression) into a Linear Program format, we introduce the following variables.
Let xuic, x
c
uu0 , and x
0
uic
be binary variables such that:
xuic =
8>><>>:
















Therefore, the mathematical model (which minimizes the number of invalid received mea-
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Subject to
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Figure 3.3: Starting Point of The PDC Timer
 The number of valid measurements within a timer period: to determine the number
of received“valid” synchrophasor measurements, with the same time stamp, within a
PDC timeout period.
uic  Th + xuic M; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.3)
uic  Th + (1  xuic)M; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.4)
Constraints (3.3)and (3.4) are the linearization of the decision variable xuic, where
measurement (ui) is valid if its delay to PDC (c) is less than Th and M is a big real
number.
uic  uu0 + tout + xcuiu0  M; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc; u0 2 Nu; ui 6= u0 (3.5)
uic  uu0 + tout   (1   xcuiu0)M; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc; u0 2 Nu; ui 6= u0 (3.6)
Constraints (3.5) and (3.6) are the linearization of the decision variable xcuiu0 , where
u0c is the delay from all PMUs (u0) to PDC (c). Measurement (ui) is valid if it
arrives at PDC (c) within the tout value, which starts at the arrival of the first received
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  1; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.7)
X
u0 6=u
xcuiu0  x0uic M; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.8)X
u0 6=u
xcuiu0  0; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.9)
Constraints (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) specify that when the measurement (ui) arrives
within c’s timer, then the value of x0uic should be equal to zero. Finally, the value of
uic can be described as follows:
uic = xuic + x
0
uic
; 8ui 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.10)
 Delay Constraints: this ensures that the constructed forwarding trees satisfy the ap-
plications’ delay requirements. As defined in the IEEE Std. C37.118.2, the total
delay of synchrophasor data is composed of a communication delay (td) and termi-
nal processing delays (tPMU ) and (tAPP ) as shown in Figure (3.29). Moreover, some
literature further divides the total delay into six terms as in (3.11), [97].
tdelay = tPMU + td + tAPP
= tPMU + (tPDC + tRN + tBN) + tAPP
(3.11)
where tPMU , tPDC , and tAPP are considered as PMU latency, PDC latency and the
time the application takes to process and respond to the received synchrophasors,
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Figure 3.4: WAMS Delays
delays over regional and backbone networks. In this chapter, we focus on the regional
networks, while the backbone network is considered as a black box [97].
In particular, the processing delays can be limited to small ranges or even fixed to
constant as proposed in the PDC standard [4]. However, the communication delay
is normally uncertain and stochastic [98]. Therefore, many research activities study
the stochastic nature of communication delays through experiments or simulations
and then, model the average or stochastic values [99–101]. For example, Zhang et al
measure the communication delay of Guizhou Power Grid in 100 seconds and model
the communication delays as constant [99]. The latency of a process bus network of
a substation is tested in a laboratory environment in [101], and the impact of data loss
and latency on digital protection are analyzed. In [97], the authors demonstrated the
dependency of synchrophasor application reliability on the system architecture while
considering data delay and losses.
The end-to-end communication delay from a source to a destination can be described
as the sum of processing delay, queuing delay, transmission delay, and propaga-
tion delay on each link along the path connecting the source (PMU) and destination
(PDC). Processing delay can be neglected since routers are considered as forwarding
nodes (no processing), measurements processing occurs at end nodes (PDCs) [102].
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Moreover, the propagation delay is assumed to be no more than 1 microsecond [102].








where tijtrans and tijque are the transmission delays and queuing delays on link ij re-
spectively. The transmission delay tijtrans on (i; j) is calculated as follows:
tijtrans = fij=Cij; 8(i; j) 2 E (3.13)
where fij is the total flow (e.g., number of packets carrying measurements) on link
(i; j). The queuing delay (of packets at node i which are forwarded on link ij) can
be determined by the traffic behaviour and can be approximated as follows:
tijque = 1=(  ij); 8(i; j) 2 E (3.14)
where  is the mean service rate (e.g., average number of packets processed per
second by the router) which depends on the port speed and ij is the average rate of
traffic arriving to this port; ij is modelled as a function of the flow conservation vari-
ables yucij . Finally, the propagation delay t
ij
prop is calculated by the distance between
nodes and the speed of light in the communication medium. Now, the end-to-end




yucij ijtrans; 8c 2 Nc; u 2 Nu (3.15)
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The PDC processing delay can be calculated as follows:
tPDC = tout + talig + tbuff (3.16)
where tout is the timer of the PDC, talig is the time for processing and alignment at
PDC c, and tbuff is communication system buffering and error correction.
 Flow Conservation Constraints: to construct the forwarding trees between PMUs








1 if i = u
 1 if i = c
0 if i = r








yucij 8u 2 Nu; (i; j) 2 E (3.19)
fuij  yucij 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Nc; (i; j) 2 E (3.20)
The first constraint represents the flow conservation constraints for yucij , constraints
(3.17) and (3.18) describe the relation between yucij and x
u
ij as they ensure that if
there is a path between PMU u and PDC c on link (i; j), then link (i; j) is a link in
the constructed forwarding tree. Constraints (3.19) and (3.20) describe the relation
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between yucij and f
u
ij as if link (i; j) is on the path from u to c, then this link should
have flow from PMU u.
fuij  xuij 8u 2 Nu; (i; j) 2 E (3.21)
xuij   (fuij=M)  0 8u 2 Nu; (i; j) 2 E (3.22)
Constraint (3.21) and (3.22) describe the relation between xuij and f
u
ij , if there is no
flow on link (i; j) then link (i; j) is not on the tree of PMU u.






xcij  jSj   1; 8S  N; 2  jSj  jN j (3.23)
where S is a subset of nodes such that S  N .
 Edge Capacity Constraint: to ensure that the constructed tree satisfies edge capacity
constraints we use the following constraint:
X
u
fuij  Cij; 8(i; j) 2 E (3.24)
 Number of flows to PDC c: to ensure that the number of flow on the last link that
connects the PMUs to PDC c is equal to the number of PMUs sending to that PDC
X
u
fuic = Sci 8c 2 Nc; (i; c) 2 E (3.25)
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where Sci is the number of PMUs sending to PDC ci






yucic = Dui 8c 2 Nc (3.26)
where Dui is the number of destinations (PDCs) for PMU ui






Constraints (3) - (11), (16), and (18) - (28)
3.4 Numerical Results
We evaluate our tree construction method presented earlier and compare it with a base
method that uses shortest trees for carrying the measurements from PMUs to their desti-
nation PDCs. The shortest tree is computed using Dijkstra’s method [103]. Moreover, we
compared our proposed tree model with the multicast trees proposed in [75]. We consider
the following IEEE test systems: the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 24-bus, and IEEE 30-bus, New
England 39-bus, and 57-bus test systems. Our numerical results are divided into two parts:
performance evaluation and cyber-attack impact analysis. For the performance evaluation,
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we compare the number of invalid measurements by varying the value of the timeout pe-
riod at PDCs. The timeout period at the PDC determines how long the PDC will have to
wait after it receives the first measurement (a measurement with new time stamp) from a
PMU before it sends the collected measurements in its buffer to a super PDC or to the con-
trol center. A tight value for this period implies a small allowable delay variation between
different measurements, thus ensuring their timeliness. However, at a tight value, the tree
construction becomes a hard task and the forwarding tree may contain more links, increas-
ing the communication cost. Moreover, we compare the number of invalid measurements
using different set of destinations for each PMU. Then, we compare the average number of
links per forwarding tree as well as the computation cost for finding solutions using differ-
ent set of destinations. Finally, we varied the timeout value for the PDCs to mimic WAMS
applications different delay requirements.
On the other hand, for the cyber-attack impact analysis, we simulate an attack on a
communication link and study the impact on the constructed trees. Then, we validate our
model using a real-time co-simulation. Our numerical evaluations are conducted using
CPLEX solver version 12.4 on a Windows 7 machine running at 2.67 GHz with 6.00 GB
RAM.
The electric power grid is considered completely observable when all of its system
states are uniquely identified [104]. The system states can be estimated at the control
centre based on the received measurements from sensors across geographically dispersed
areas. With the increased deployment of PMUs, a lot of research work has been proposed
to find the minimum number of PMUs along with their optimal locations to ensure sys-
tem observability [105]. Different scenarios have been studied when finding the optimal
PMU placement such as normal conditions, single PMU outages, single branch outages,
and with or without conventional measurements. In this chapter, we consider the optimal
PMU placement under normal operating conditions with no conventional measurements as
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Table 3.1: Optimal PMU number and placement for each test system
Test System Number of PMUs Bus Locations
IEEE 14-bus 4 2,6,7,9
IEEE 24-bus 7 2,3,8,10,16,21,23
IEEE 30-bus 10 2,3,6,9,10,12,15,19,25,27
presented in [105]. Table 3.1 shows the optimal number of PMUs needed for observability
for each test system and corresponding bus locations. Each PMU sends its measurements
to a randomly generated set of destinations.
3.4.1 Performance Evaluation
We start by comparing the number and percentage of received invalid measurements
for each test system as shown in Table (3.2). As we mentioned previously, a measurement
is valid if it arrives within the PDC timeout period and its end-to-end delay is less than
the end-to-end delay threshold (For example, a typical PDC timer for the state estimation
is 50 ms [80]). We compare the number of measurements during different PDC timer
values (30 ms, 40 ms, 50 ms, and 60 ms) for each test system. Clearly, a larger value for
the PDC timeout will result in a smaller number of invalid measurements, as it is easier
to find forwarding trees with loose delay variation; however, some WAMS applications,
such as control applications, can not tolerate large values for the PDC timer. Although
when the value of (tout) is large, the shortest path tree and the multicast trees in [75] can
generate trees with no or small number of invalid measurements, however, when (tout) is
small then the other methods generate trees with large number of invalid measurements
even though we can, through our model, find different routes in the network to minimize
the number of invalid measurements (see Table (3.2)). For example, the number of invalid
measurements at PDCs (using the shortest path) is equal to 4 when tout = 30ms (for
IEEE 14-bus test system), which is 40% of the total number (10) of measurements (see
53
Table 3.2: Number and Percentage of ”invalid” Measurements
Test System Trees 30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Shortest Path 4 40 % 3 30 % 1 10 % 1 10 %
Wei and Kundur [75] 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 1 5 % 0 0 % 0 0% 0 0%
Shortest Path 5 23 % 3 14 % 2 9 % 0 0 %
Wei and Kundur [75] 2 9% 6 14 % 3 9 % 1 4%
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 % 0 0 %
Shortest Path 5 13 % 4 10 % 1 3 % 1 3 %
Wei and Kundur [75] 13 36% 5 13% 1 3% 0 0%
Table 3.2). Our model however will delay the arrival of the first measurement (that will
initiate the timer) by forwarding it through a longer path to compensate the variation in
the delay between measurements and allow those measurements to make it within the time
out period of the PDC. In fact, intentionally forwarding the PMU data through a longer
path endangers those time-sensitive WAMS applications; however, in our model we have
an end-to-end delay constraint to ensure that even when using longer route the end-to-end
delay does not exceed a specific threshold to ensure the strict delay requirements of WAMS
applications. On the other hand, forwarding measurements along shortest trees will violate
the constraint of delay variation and hence more measurements arriving after tout period
are deemed invalid.
Then, we varied the value of Tout for different PDCs in the same run to mimic the delay
variation of WAMS application as shown in Table (3.3).
Next, we study the effect of the tree construction on the communication cost, which is
measured by the number of communication links added on the forwarding trees. Indeed,
more links along the forwarding trees imply higher network bandwidth consumption. In
Table (3.4), we compare the average number of links per tree for the shortest path tree,
the multicast tree in [75], and the proposed tree model. The table shows only a slight
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Table 3.3: The number of Invalid measurements and the average number of links per tree
using different tout values
Test System Invalid Measurements Links per Tree
IEEE 14-bus 0 9
IEEE 24-bus 0 12
IEEE 30-bus 0 14
Table 3.4: Average Number of Links per Tree
Test System Trees 30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 9 8 8 9
Shortest Path 8 8 8 8
Wei and Kundur [75] 9 9 9 9
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 14 12 12 12
Shortest Path 12 12 12 12
Wei and Kundur [75] 14 14 14 14
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 16 16 16 16
Shortest Path 15 15 15 15
Wei and Kundur [75] 15 15 15 15
increase in the average number of links on the forwarding trees constructed by our model.
Moreover, we randomize the selection of destinations for each PMU and investigate the
impact on the number of links per tree as shown in Table (3.5). It is clear that changing
the set of destinations doesn’t change the average number of links per tree as the proposed
model manages to construct trees with different destinations while keeping the number of
links and hence the cost of the tree minimized.
Table 3.5: Average Number of Links per Tree (different set of destinations)
Test System Trees 30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 9 8 8 8
Shortest Path 8 8 9 8
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 13 13 12 12
Shortest Path 12 13 12 12
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 16 15 16 16
Shortest Path 15 15 116 15
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Table 3.6: End-end delay (in Milliseconds)
Test System Trees 30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 90 95 98 96
Shortest Path 88 88 88 88
Wei and Kundur [75] 82 82 82 82
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 62 85 63 64
Shortest Path 63 63 63 63
Wei and Kundur [75] 60 60 60 60
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 72 71 69 72
Shortest Path 72 72 72 72
Wei and Kundur [75] 65 65 65 65
Table 3.7: CPU run-time using the proposed tree model (Mathematical Model Vs. Heuristic
Approach)
Test System Trees 60 ms 50 ms 40 ms 30 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 0.03 sec. 0.03 sec. 0.17 sec. 0.52 sec.
Heuristic 0.121 sec. 0.131 sec. 0.119 sec. 0.122 sec.
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 17.60 sec. 41.17 sec. 113.65 sec. 837.38 sec.
Heuristic 0.140 sec. 0.145 sec. 0.138 sec. 0.143 sec.
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 3.20 sec. 89.93 sec. 2202.44 sec. >150 hours
Heuristic 0.204 sec. 0.208 sec. 0.222 sec. 0.204 sec.
IEEE 39-bus
Proposed Model NA NA NA NA
Heuristic 0.237 sec. 0.236 sec. 0.241 sec. 0.245 sec.
IEEE 57-bus
Proposed Model NA NA NA NA
Heuristic 0.297 sec. 0.314 sec. 0.306 sec. 0.331 sec.
Then, we compared the average end-to-end delay of the proposed model with the end-
to-end delay of the other approaches as shown in Table (3.29). It is clear that even though
our proposed model has larger delay in some cases, however, the proposed model manages
to maintain the end-to-end delay less than the threshold for all cases.
Next, we compare the computational time of our proposed tree model for each test
system as shown in Table 4.15. We experiment with different values of (tout) and we
observe that increasing the value of the timer decreases the run time to compute the model.
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Table 3.8: CPU run-time using the proposed tree model
Timer IEEE 14-bus IEEE 24-bus IEEE 30-bus
60 ms 0.03 sec. 17.60 sec. 3.20 sec.
50 ms 0.03 sec. 41.17 sec. 89.93 sec.
40 ms 0.17 sec. 113.65 sec. 2202.44 sec.
30 ms 0.52 sec. 837.38 sec. > 540000 sec.
Table 3.9: Average CPU run-time using the proposed tree model (different set of destina-
tions)
Timer IEEE 14-bus IEEE 24-bus IEEE 30-bus
60 ms 0.172 sec. 1.14 sec. 168.81 sec.
50 ms 0.256 sec. 20.916 sec. 93.242 sec.
40 ms 0.576 sec. 2133.67 sec. 4834.355 sec.
30 ms 0.514 sec. 4419.548 sec. >77685.88 sec.
However, when the value of (tout) decreases and becomes very small, the run time of the
model increases substantially. The reason of the increase is that at smaller values of (tout)
it becomes quite difficult for the model to find a tree that can guarantee delay variation for
the measurements, and possibly this tree may not exist. For example, when tout = 30ms,
the model ran for more than 150 hours for the IEEE 30-bus system and did not generate a
solution.
Clearly, the proposed model is hard to scale for larger test systems. To this extent, we
propose a heuristic approach to tackle this problem. In this approach, the tree construction
will be done off line where for each PMU we generate a number of random multicast trees.
For example, for each PMU we have a set of possible trees (first shortest path, second
shortest path, etc.) to connect this PMU (ui) with its set of destinations PDCs. Then, we
use the following mathematical model to choose the best tree combination for each PDC
such that the number of invalid measurements is minimized.
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3.4.2 Mathematical Model for Tree Selection
First, for each PMU we generate a set of possible multicat trees (first shortest path,
second shortest path, etc.) offline. Then we take the generated trees as an input to the
following mathematical model. The result of such model is a set of trees that satisfies the
end-to-end delay constraint and has the minimum number of invalid measurements for each
PDC.
Mathematical Model:
Let u be a set of possible trees for PMUu, u = fTi1; Ti2; :::; TiMg. For each PMU u send-
ing synchrophasor measurement to PDC c there is a set of M possible paths fPmucgm=1::M
from PMU u to PDC c. Let tum be binary variable such that: the nth tree in u ( the set of
all trees for PMU u).
tum =
8>><>>:
0 if the mth tree of PMU u is selected
1 otherwise
And ijum is a parameter defined as follows:
ijum =
8>><>>:
0 if the mth tree of PMU u traverses link(i; j)
1 otherwise
Then ijum  tum will be equal 1 only if the mth tree of PMU u is selected and traverses
link (i; j). Therefore, the mathematical model (that selects PMUs’ tree with minimum







Table 3.10: Number and Percentage of ”invalid” Measurements
Test System Trees 60 ms 50 ms 40 ms 30 ms
IEEE 39-bus
Shortest Path 3 7 % 3 7 % 6 14 % 7 16 %
Heuristic 0 0 % 1 2 % 2 4 % 5 11 %
IEEE 57-bus
Shortest Path 3 4 % 6 9 % 7 11 % 8 12 %
Heuristic 1 1 % 1 1 % 3 4 % 4 6 %
X
m




ijum  tum; 8(i; j) 2 E (3.28)






(tum ij); 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Nc (3.30)
Constraints (3) - (10)
Constraint (3.28) calculates the total flow over link (i; j), which means the number of
selected trees of all PMUs going though link (i; j). Constraint (3.29) computes the delay
on link (i; j), and Constraint (3.30) calculates the end-to-end delay form PMU u to PDC c.
Then, we assess how well our proposed heuristic perform compared to the shortest tree
construction as shown in Table (3.10). Moreover, we compare the CPU run time of the
proposed model Vs. the heuristic approach in Table (3.7).
3.4.3 Delay attack Impact Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of delays attacks (due to cyber-attacks) on
the constructed trees. Even though WAMS communication network tends to be a dedicated
Intranet, this does not mean that such networks are immune to cyber-attacks. For instance,
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removable media such as USB drives can be used to carry malware and hack computers
to be used as sources of other attacks such as denial of service (DoS). Moreover, increas-
ing the number of mobile devices can be used as a malicious medium and we cannot rule
out the possibility that utility employees directly inject attacks into the network [8, 106].
A delay attack may be caused by flooding the network with a huge amount of redundant
data traffic to consume the target (communication link) resources such as network band-
width; this means that a very limited bandwidth is left for the useful data. In this case,
the measurements data will experience longer communication delays and as a result may
be dropped by the PDC. As a consequence, this can blind the system operators and in-
crease the vulnerability of the grid to further attacks or inappropriate operations. More
importantly, regardless to any consequences, the impacts of acting on incorrect or missing
information will have already propagated into the rest of the system. At this stage, it may
already be too late to avoid a wide-area power outage within the grid [107].
First, we consider the IEEE 14-bus test system where 3 PDCs and 4 PMUs are installed
to ensure the system observability as shown in Figure (3.5). The communication links are
placed in parallel with the transmission lines and each bus is represented as a communi-
cation node which can send, receive and route measurements [80]. For a detailed model
of realistic communication for the IEEE 14-bus standard test system readers are refereed
to [108]. Moreover, in [109], designing a communication network for the smart grid and
communication requirements of different applications has been investigated. In [110], an
IP based decentralized communication infrastructure that addresses different applications
requirements is proposed. Finally, the requierements for a communication infrastructure in
the smart grid has been addresed in [31, 102, 111–114, 114].
Each PMU is sending its measurements to a set of destination PDCs, and the values
of (Th) and (tout) are 120 ms and 60 ms, respectively. Then, we simulate an attack on a
communication link (chosen based on the frequency of its appearance in the constructed
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trees) in the network; due to this attack, additional delays will be added to that link. First,
we simulate an attack on link (6; 12) by inducing 20 ms to that link and construct our
trees. However, we observe that such delay did not have a big impact on the constructed
trees; thus we increased the induced delay to 40 ms and observe the constructed trees. We
consider PMU 4 (installed at bus 9) as shown in Figure (3.5) that sends measurements to
all installed PDCs. The constructed trees before and after the attack are shown in Figure
3.7. We notice that attacking a communication link will change the constructed trees and
a new path has been constructed. Figure (3.6) shows the number of invalid measurements
as we vary the amount of injected delays. Clearly, the larger the delay value, the more
invalid measurements and hence more dropped packets at PDCs. In the case of IEEE 30-
bus system, the model was always able to avoid the attacked link and construct forwarding
trees that will meet the delay constraints. Moreover, we simulate an attack on a communi-
cation link in the network; such attack causes link disconnection. Figure (3.8) shows the
number of invalid measurements due to link disconnection. It is clear that disconnecting a
communication link will result in some measurements being dropped at the PDC. As dis-
connecting a communication link might force some measurements to follow other routes
(with larger delay) to avoid the disconnected link resulting in dropped measurements at the
PDC due to the expiration of the PDC timer or violating the end-to-end delay. It should
be noted that if one PMU frame is discarded by the PDC due to a time-out, then the com-
putations of WAMS applications have to be performed based on the most recently available
PMU data frames, and these measurements are one or more reporting cycle old. We notice
that even when attacking more than one communication link, the proposed model man-
ages to maximize the network performance against attack by minimizing the number of
invalid measurements even for larger network (IEEE 30-bus) where the number on invalid
measurements remains zero after injecting 100 ms.
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Figure 3.8: Number of ”Invalid” Measurements After Line Disconnection
3.4.4 Validation on Real-time Co-simulator
In this subsection, we validate the performance of the proposed model in comparison
with shortest path tree using a real-time co-simulation testbed. In this testbed, a hardware-
in-the-loop approach to simulate the power grid real-time dynamics is used. Our hardware-
in-the-loop (HIL) testbed is enabled with four PMUs from different manufacturers. Those
PMUs receive the analog output from Hypersim, and sample the measurements in the form
of C37.118 traffic. The traffic generated by the PMUs is routed to two physical PDCs, one
considered as local and the other as regional. The local PDC aggregates the measurements,
and forwards them to the regional PDC. The regional PDC sends the received measurement
to the control center.
For the power simulator, we use OPAL-RT [115] Hypersim machine that is capable of sim-
ulating models of the power grid using the AC power model in real time. By assigning
sensors to different components of the power model we are able to collect measurements
that reflect the power system status. Such measurements are collected and sampled in the
form of C37.118 [116] standard. On the other hand, to simulate the communication net-
work component of the smart grid, we used OpenStack [117] technology, which provides
a various set of services that meets the needs of the smart grid. Then, using OpenStack we
built a virtual network that interfaces with the PMUs, PDCs, and the control center. The
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control center constitutes of different applications that monitor and control the state of the
grid. Our control center constitutes of a software from SEL [118], Synchrowave Central.
Experimental Setup: Our experimentation setup consists of the IEEE 14-bus test sys-
tem, and a coupled communication network. Through this setup, we aim at studying the
impact of delay attack on WAMS. To enable this study, we installed two PMUs. PMUA
measures the magnitude, phase angle, frequency, and rate of change of frequency (RO-
COF) for the three phases, while PMUB is placed to collect similar measurements to those
collected by PMUA. Using IEEE C37.118 [116], the two PMUs send the collected mea-
surements to PDC1. Then, PDC1 aggregates the received C37.118 data using the associated
time stamps, and sends them to the control center. The communication network used for
this setup is depicted in Figure (3.13). To simulate delay attack on WAMS through PMU
measurements, we introduced an attacker in the form of a transparent bridge capable of
injecting delays in the communication link between the first hop router of PMUB and the
last hop router of the PDC. Therefore, following the shortest path tree (minimum number
of hops) without considering end-to-end delay and the delay variation at the PDC will re-
sult in packets drop (PMUB) as seen in Figures ((3.9), (3.11)). On the other hand, under
attacks, our model manages to find alternative route such that the end-to-end delay and
delay variation constraints are satisfied as shown in Figures ((3.10), (3.12)).
Such packets drop can impact the performance of WAMS applications(e.g., state estima-
tion, power system oscillation damping, etc.). For example, considering a transmission line
fault detection application where synchrophasor measurements (synchronized voltages and
currents at two terminals of a transmission line) are used to estimate fault location. If a
measurement from one PMU is dropped due to delay attack then the performance of such
application will be affected as old measurements from previous sampling cycles will be
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Figure 3.12: Voltage Angle Using The Proposed Model
PMU A (To: PDC1) PMU B (To: PDC1)











Figure 3.13: Virtual network topology created on openstack
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4. Optimal Tree Construction Model for
Cyber-Attacks to Wide Area
Measurement Systems
4.1 Introduction
Today, the smart grid is being upgraded with the addition of synchrophasor systems,WAMS.
They are used to supervise the state of the power grid by collecting measurement val-
ues, displayed and processed by human operators and/or control-center applications, from
widely distributed sensors. As mentioned in Chapter (2), A common type of sensors is
PMUs developed in the early 1980s. PMUs provide a time-stamped voltage and current
phasors by utilizing the GPS clock. These time-stamped measurements are then transmit-
ted to a PDC. The role of a PDC is to aggregate and correlate the time-stamped measure-
ments from different PMUs, then sends the correlated measurements to a Super PDC at
the control center as shown in Figure (4.1). PMU measurements play an important role in
smart grid operations. For instance, solving the system state estimation [104], which is the
process of estimating the state of the grid by gathering measurements from geographically
dispersed areas through WAMS and SCADA systems. This process is crucial to several












Figure 4.1: WAMS System
pricing, etc. As PMUs are being increasingly deployed, it is predicted that traditional state
estimation using conventional measurements from SCADA systems will be ultimately re-
placed by all-PMU state estimators to enhance the system state estimation and security
assessment [21]. However, the increased integration of PMUs introduces new vulnerabil-
ities to cyber-attacks, which if exploited by attackers, may have damaging consequences
ranging from local power outage to complete blackout [20, 21]. Therefore, several algo-
rithms have been proposed to detect the presence of such attacks [23–25]. With detection,
actions must be considered to prevent the propagation of cyber-attacks, which is the aim of
this chapter
As mentioned earlier, it is more reasonable to consider IP Multicast protocols for car-
rying PMU measurements; IP multicast minimizes packet replication and thus is more
bandwidth efficient. The set of nodes that support an IP multicast (the source node, all
destination nodes, and all relay nodes) is referred to as a multicast tree. The first node in
the PMU multicast tree is called a First-Hop-Router (FHR), which is the first node in the
structure between the PMU and its destinations. The multicast tree is updated whenever a
68
new PDC wishes to become a receiver for a specific PMU; receivers can join and discon-
nect from the tree at any time [39]. Constructing such multicast trees requires an in-depth
knowledge of the WAMS system, which can be available to the system operator. For ex-
ample, state estimation that runs every few seconds in WAMS gives the system operator
direct access to the system state at any given instant, which will provide the operator with
a wealth historical data that can be used to characterize the system state [119]. Therefore,
several WAMS application can be used to gain the needed knowledge of the system in use.
Now, manipulated PMU measurements received at the control center could result in
catastrophic damages to the power grid, especially for applications that rely on PMU mea-
surements for control and protection [38]. Recently, multiple PMU vulnerabilities have
been reported by OSlsoft [120]. These vulnerabilities could be exploited remotely causing
a data gap for the interface of IEEE C37.118, which is the standard developed to trans-
fer synchropahsor data streams from PMUs to PDCs (see Chapter 2). Therefore, efficient
security mechanisms must be implemented to minimize the impact of cyber attacks. Al-
though, the multicast tree proposed in [38] utilizes some security standards such as the IEC
62351, it does not take into consideration the propagation of cyber-attacks. In the presence
of an attack, the attacker can use the compromised PMUs to, for instance, propagate the
attack to compromise other PMUs and jeopardize the system’s observability and reliability.
Propagation of cyber-attacks in shared communication network has been studied in other
networks [37,85,121,122]. As a relevant instance, worm propagation in mobile ad-hoc net-
works and metering devices in a secondary distribution network has been studied in [123]
and [84], respectively.
Note that under an attack, the system operator will disconnect the compromised de-
tected PMUs from the network [37], which requires t time, during such time the attack
could propagate to other PMUs to increase the attack damage. In [37], the cyber-attack
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propagation in a PMU network is studied and the probability of attack propagation is min-
imized by disabling detected compromised PMUs and PMUs that are likely to be compro-
mised due to attack propagation. Moreover, the weak authentication and integrity checks
and software security of the communication network have been reported in [124].
Under IP multicast, a tree is constructed for each PMU (being its root) to find a path
from the PMU to its PDC destinations. The tree may traverse a large number of routers in
the network; thus, amplifying the propagation of attacks from a compromised PMU to a set
of uncompromised ones along the path to the PDCs. In this context, this chapter addresses
the problem of tree construction for collecting PMU measurements while minimizing the
impact of the attack propagation from compromised PMUs to others. The relation between
the multicast tree of each PMU and the probability of attack propagation has not been
addressed before.
This chapter is devoted towards investigating the attack propagation problem in PMUs
network; as opposed to existing work [37], here we restrict our attention to the relation be-
tween IP multicast and cyber-attack propagation. We propose an optimal IP Multicast tree
construction for each connected PMU to minimize the likelihood of cyber-attacks propa-
gation while satisfying the real-time requirements.
4.2 Problem Description
Consider a WAMS that consists of a number of PMUs and PMU data consumers (i.e.,
PDCs, super PDCs, data historian, etc.) as shown in Figure (4.2). The main components
in this system are PMUs, routers, and PDCs. Each PMU is directly connected to a router,
through which its measurements are sent to a set of destinations using the IP multicast
routing protocol as proposed in [38]. Thus, in this chapter, we consider the problem of
gathering PMUs measurements at end paths PDCs using IP multicast forwarding while







PMU Data Consumer (PDCs, Data Historian, etc.)
PMUj
Optimal IP Multicast 
 IP Multicast 
Figure 4.2: PMU Message Stream (IP Multicast)
The system can be abstracted to a directed graphG = (N;E), where E is a set of edges
and N is a set of nodes, N = Nm [Nd [Nr, where Nm represents a set of PMUs, where
Nm = fm1; : : :mjNmjg. Notion Nd represents a set of PDCs where Nd = fd1; : : : djNdjg,
and Nr is a set of routers connecting PMUs and PDCs where Nr = fr1; : : : ; rjNrjg.
Among these nodes, a source m 2 Nm sends its measurements to a set of destinations
Dm. We assume throughout this chapter that the communication between a source m and
its destinations Dm is based on the IP Multicast as proposed in [125]. We also assume that
not all routers in the network are connected to PMUs, such routers are considered to be
forwarding routers. Hence, let N 0r be a set of routers each is connected to at least one PMU
where N 0r  Nr.
In the presence of a cyber-attack, the attacker can use the compromised PMU to propa-
gate the attack to other PMUs through the communication links and the set of routers along
the path, which will exacerbate the damage to the power system even further [37].
Namely, and similar to [37], let ij be the probability that the attack propagates from a
compromised PMUi to an uncompromised PMUj , where ij  0 if PMUj is not connected
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to any router traversed by PMUi multicast tree. Thus:
ij = 
Dij (4.1)
where  represents the probability that the attack propagates through a router,  is the
probability that the attack propagates to another PMU, and Dij is the number of routers
connecting PMUi and PMUj , the so-called nodal distance [37].
Our objective in this chapter is therefore to construct multicast trees, each connecting a
PMU to its set of PDCs, while minimizing the probability of attack propagation.
4.3 Optimal Tree Construction
In this section, we start with a simple example to illustrate the cyber-attack propagation
problem and our proposed multicast tree construction model. Figure (4.3) shows an IEEE
6-bus test system with six buses and eleven transmission lines. To ensure system observ-
ability, PMUs are placed at buses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 as presented in [37]. Each PMU sends its
measurements to a set of destinations (i.e., PDCs, super PDCs, etc.) through a randomly
generated data network as shown in Figure (4.3). For instance, if PMU 3 is detected to
be under an attack, it takes some time t to disconnect the detected compromised PMU,
which gives the attack an opportunity to propagate in the network [37]. Therefore, cyber-
attack propagation should be considered while constructing the multicast trees to prevent
such propagation. A multicast tree of PMU3 is constructed using our proposed tree con-
struction model and using a shortest path tree construction as shown in Figure (4.4). In
the case of shortest path multicast tree, PMU3 sends the measurements to its FHR (router
4) and follows a shorter path to PDC1 and PDC2. Considering PMU6 (being one of its
neighbour) the nodal distance between PMU3 and PMU6 is equal to 2, which means that




























































Figure 4.3: 6-Bus Test System
On the other hand, using our proposed tree construction, the multicast tree of PMU3
follows a longer path (larger nodal distance). In this case, the likelihood that the attack
might propagate from PMU3 to PMU6 is 36  0.
Smart grid applications, which rely on PMU measurements require a fast communica-
tion infrastructure that can handle a huge amount of data in near real-time. In such systems,
PMUs sample the measured data at an instant known as time tag and then transmit this
tagged measurements to PDCs. All measurements with the same time tag should be col-
lected in a timely manner leading to delay requirements in the order of milliseconds [126].
Thus, it is important that the source PMU reaches all terminals within an acceptable delay.
The end-to-end delay from a source to a destination can be described as the sum of pro-

















Figure 4.4: PMU3 Multicast Trees. (a) Shortest Path Tree; (b) Proposed Multicast Tree
can be neglected since routers are considered as forwarding nodes (no processing), mea-
surements processing occurs at end nodes (PDCs) and this processing delay is considered
as computation delay not communication delay [102]. Moreover, the propagation delay is
assumed to be no more than 1 microsecond [102]. Thus, the total end-to-end communica-
tion delay is considered as the sum of transmission delay Tij and queuing delay Qij , which
can be defined as follows:
ij = Qij + Tij; 8(i; j) 2 E (4.2)
Let Cij be the capacity of edge (i; j), fmij be the flow from PMU m on edge (i; j), md
be the delay from PMU m to destination d, and Th is a delay threshold (in the range of
100 milliseconds to 5 seconds [102]). Let xmij be a binary variable such that:
xmij =
8>><>>:
1 if edge (i; j) is in the multicast tree of m
0 otherwise




1 if the path from m to d traverses edge (i; j)
0 otherwise
The queuing and transmission delays can be defined as follows:
Qij = 1 n (  ij); 8(i; j) 2 E (4.3)
Tij = f
m
ij n Cij; 8(i; j) 2 E (4.4)
where  is the mean service rate that depends on the port speed and ij is the total traffic
through this port on link (i; j), which is the function of the flow conservation variables ymdij .
Then, we mathematically formulate the problem of constructing multicast trees with the
objective of minimizing the probability of cyber-attack propagation as follows:





 Propagation Probability constraint:
ij  ; 8i; j 2 Nm : i 6= j (4.5)
By minimizing  in the objective we are minimizing the probability of attack prop-
agation ij from a compromised PMUi to any other connected PMUj , where  is
some real number.
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 Flow Conservation Constraints: to construct our tree we use the following con-
straints:
fmij   xmij  0; 8m 2 Nm; (i; j) 2 E (4.6)
xmij   (fmij =B)  0; 8m 2 Nm; (i; j) 2 E (4.7)








 k if i = m
 1 if i = d








1 if i = m
 1 if i = d
0 if i = r
Constraints (4.6) and (4.7) represent the connectivity between the flow (fmij ) and the
tree edges (xmij ), which implies that f
m
ij = 0 , xmij = 0 and fmij > 0 , xmij = 1.
Constraint (4.8) indicates that there is no path between m and d along the edge (i; j)
unless (i; j) is part of the multicast tree of source m. Finally, the last two constraints
describe the flow conservation constraints to ensure that the total incoming flow at a
particular node is equal to the total outgoing flow, where k represents the number of
all destinations.







xmij  jSj   1; 8S  N; 2  jSj  jN j (4.9)
 Edge Capacity Constraint: to ensure that the constructed multicast tree satisfies edge
capacity constraints we use the following constraint:
X
m
fmij  Cij 8(i; j) 2 E (4.10)
 Acceptable Delay Constraint: the following constraint are used to ensure that the




ymdij ij 8m 2 Nm; d 2 Dm (4.11)
md  Th 8m 2 Nm; d 2 Dm (4.12)
Queuing delay as described in equation (4.3) will yield a non-linear problem for-
mulation since Qij is modeled as a function of ij . Thus, in this chapter we only
consider the transmission delay Tij .
Moreover, calculating the probability in Constraint (4.5) depends on the nodal dis-
tance (Dij) between PMUi and PMUj as shown in equation (4.1), which varies based
on the selected multicast tree; hence, yield a non-linear formulation as well. To over-
come this non-linearity, a mathematical transformation can be used where we rewrite
the logarithm of the attack propagation (logij = log  + Dij log ) and instead of
minimizing ij , we equivalently maximize the nodal distance Dij .
Therefore, to tackle the nonlinearity of Constraint (4.5), we cast our problem as a
maximization of the nodal distance between PMUi and PMUj , then we minimize the
number of trees traversing a router that is connected to at least one PMU. However,
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maximizing the nodal distance between PMUs will expand the multicast tree, lead-
ing to an increased delay that might violate the real time requirements for smart grid
applications. Therefore, a trade-off between the security level and delay should be
considered. Moreover, minimizing the number of incoming links traversing a FHR
means that the probability of attack propagation from a router to a PMU will be
minimized.
Accordingly, we rewrite our mathematical model to maximize the nodal distance.
Let xj be the number of incoming links (trees) traversing router j where j 2 N 0r.














xmij 8j 2 N 0r (4.14)
Constraint (4.13) describes the relation between the new objective function, the nodal
distance between PMUs, and the number of incoming links to router j 2 N 0r. Con-
straint (4.14) presents the number of incoming links traversing a router that is con-
nected to at least one PMU.
Yet, the computation of Dij remains missing. To this extent, we introduce two new








1 if there is a path from m to x
0 otherwise
Based on this, we can calculate the nodal distance between a source m and any node
x as follows:
zmxij  xmij 8(i; j) 2 E;m 2 Nm; x 2 N 0r (4.15)








1 hmx if i = m
 1 hmx if i = d




zmxij + (1  hmx)B 8m 2 Nm; x 2 N 0r (4.17)
Constraints (4.15) and (4.16) indicate the relation between zmxij and x
m
ij , hmx and x
m
ij ,
respectively; where the path from source m to node x traverses edge (i; j) if and only if
edge (i; j) is part of m’s multicast tree. Constraint (4.3.2) describes the flow conservation
constraints of the decision variables zmxij . The nodal distance between a source m and any
node x (Dmx) is calculated in constraint (4.17). If x is part of m’s multicast tree (hmx = 1),
then Dmx is calculated as presented in constraint (4.17). On the other hand, when hmx = 0
(node x is not in the path of m’s multicast tree), we set the nodal distance between x and m
to a large number B. This number should be as large as the network diameter, to enforce
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that m can reach x through a large number of routers. Thus, the propagation becomes less
likely since the attack propagation probability decreases exponentially when the distance
increases.
Throughout our numerical we solve the following optimization model:
Maximize 
Subject to
Equations (6) - (20)
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate how well our proposed multicast tree model performs in
comparison with a shortest path multicast tree [103]. In these experiments, we consider
the IEEE test systems specifically the IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 24-bus, IEEE 30-bus, and IEEE
57-bus along with the New England 39-bus test systems, (interested readers are referred
to [127–129]).
Our numerical evaluations are conducted using CPLEX solver version 12.4 on a Windows
7 machine running at 2.67 GHz with 6.00 GB RAM.
The electric power grid is considered completely observable when all of its system
states are uniquely identified [104]. The system states can be estimated at the control
centre based on the received measurements form sensors across geographically dispersed
areas. With the increased deployment of PMUs, a lot of research work has been proposed
to find the minimum number of PMUs along with their optimal locations to insure system
observability [?, 105,130]. Different scenarios have been studied when finding the optimal
PMU placement such as normal conditions, single PMU outages, single branch outages,
and with or without conventional measurements. In this chapter, we consider the optimal
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Table 4.1: PMU’s set of destinations for the IEEE 14-bus (3 destinations)
Bus Set of destinations
2 fd1; d2g
6 fd1; d2; d3g
7 fd1; d3g
9 fd1; d2; d3g
Table 4.2: PMU’s set of destinations for the IEEE 24-bus (4 destinations)
Bus Set of destinations
2 fd1; d3; d4g
3 fd1; d2; d3; d4g
8 fd2; d3; d4g
10 fd1; d2g
16 fd1; d3; d4g
21 fd1; d2; d3g
23 fd1; d2; d3; d4g
PMU placement under normal operating conditions with no conventional measurements as
presented in [105] and [130]. Table 5.1 shows the optimal number of PMUs needed for
observability for each test system and corresponding bus locations. Each PMU sends its
measurements to a randomly generated set of destinations as shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3,
4.4, and 4.5.
First, we study the probability of attack propagation from each PMU using our pro-
posed tree construction in comparison with the shortest path tree construction. We start by
assuming that the attack propagates to another PMU with probability  = 0:05, and prop-
agates through a router with probability  = 0:05, similar to [37]; our results are shown
in Tables 4.7 to 4.12. In all tables, and due to space limits, we only consider PMUs that
if compromised, the attack will propagates to other connected PMUs. From the tables, we
can see that the proposed multicast tree construction outperforms the shortest path method
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Table 4.3: PMU’s set of destinations for the IEEE 30-bus (5 destinations)
Bus Set of destinations
2 fd1; d4g
3 fd2; d3; d4; d5g
6 fd1; d2; d3g
9 fd2; d4; d5g
10 fd1; d2; d3; d4; d5g
12 fd2; d5g
13 fd1; d3; d4; d5g
19 fd2g
25 fd1; d5g
27 fd3; d4; d5g
Table 4.4: PMU’s set of destinations for the New England 39-bus (6 destinations)
Bus Set of destinations
2 fd1; d2; d3; d6g
6 fd2; d4; d6g
9 fd1; d3g
10 fd2; d3; d4; d5; d6g
12 fd1; d2; d3; d4; d5; d6g
14 fd3; d4; d5g
17 fd1; d2; d5; d6g
19 fd3; d4g
20 fd6g
22 fd1; d3; d5; d6g
23 fd2; d4; d5g
25 fd2; d4g
29 fd1; d3; d5g
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Table 4.5: PMU’s set of destinations for the IEEE 57-bus (8 destinations)
Bus Set of destinations
1 fd3; d5; d7; d8g
4 fd1; d2; d4g
6 fd5; d8g
9 fd2; d3; d5; d6; d7g
15 fd1; d2; d3; d4; d5; d6; d7; d8g
20 fd5; d7; d8g
24 fd1; d2; d3; d6g
25 fd2; d8g
28 fd7g
32 fd5; d6; d7; d8g
36 fd1; d2; d6g
38 fd1; d2; d4; d5; d6; d7; d8g
41 fd1; d2; d4; d5; d8g
47 fd3; d4; d5; d6; d7; d8g
50 fd3; d5; d8g
53 fd1; d5g
57 fd1; d2; d5; d8g
Table 4.6: Optimal PMU number and placement for each test system
Test System Number of PMUs Bus Locations
IEEE 14-bus 4 2,6,7,9
IEEE 24-bus 7 2,3,8,10,16,21,23
IEEE 30-bus 10 2,3,6,9,10,12,15,19,25,27
New England 39-bus 13 2,6,9,10,12,14,17,19,20,22,23,25,29
IEEE 57-bus 17 1,4,6,9,15,20,24,25,28,32,36,38,41,47,50,53,57
83
specially for large test systems. We also notice from the tables that for our proposed multi-
cast trees the attack propagates from the compromised PMU to only one connected PMU.
While in the shortest path tree construction, the attack propagate from one PMU to more
than one PMU, which increase the propagation probability even further. This is due to the
fact that increasing the number of compromised PMUs will increase the propagation prob-
ability during the same t time.
Then, we study the impact of having different values for  and  on the attack propagation
probability (ij) in our proposed multicast trees. Again, we consider PMUs that if compro-
mised, the attack might propagate to other connected PMUs, for each test system as shown
in Table (4.8). It is clear that increasing the values of  and will increase the attack propa-
gation probability. We observe that in our proposed multicast trees when a PMU is attacked
and the probability of attack propagation 6= 0 then the nodal distance is always Dij = 2;
thus, in table 4.8 all results for various values of  and  are the same for all PMUs. This
is because in our tree construction, the attack propagates from a compromised PMU to a
neighbour PMU only when the FHR of the neighbour PMU has a single direct connection
to the FHR of the compromised PMU. Thus, the tree path has to traverse the FHR of the
compromised PMU in order to reach all its destinations. Since the main objective of our
tree construction is to minimize the attack propagation probability, we notice that on all
test systems under our proposed model a maximum of one or two PMUs when attacked the
attack probability is 6= 0.
After that, we study the impact of different attack scenarios on the number of PMUs that
are likely to be compromised in the case of cyber-attacks. In the first scenario, we start our
experiment by considering a single PMU under attack, then we calculate the percentage of
other connected PMUs that are likely to be compromised if this PMU is under attack. We
repeat this process for each connected PMU. After that, we calculate the average percentage
of all PMUs using our proposed tree construction and the shortest path tree construction as
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Table 4.7: Probability of attack propagation (IEEE 14-bus)
Compromised PMU Method PMU 1 PMU 3
PMU 2 Shortest Path 1:25 10 4 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 1:25 10 4 0
PMU 4 Shortest Path 0 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0
Table 4.8: Attack propagation probability with different  and 
Compromised PMU
Attack propagation probability ij
,  = 0.02 ,  = 0.03 ,  = 0.04 ,  = 0.06 ,  = 0.07 ,  = 0.08 ,  = 0.09
PMU2 (14-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU3 (24-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU2 (30-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU5 (30-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU6 (39-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU6 (57-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
PMU7 (57-bus) 8 10 6 2:7 10 5 6:4 10 5 2:16 10 4 3:43 10 4 5:12 10 4 7:29 10 4
Table 4.9: Probability of attack propagation (New England 39-bus)
Compromised PMU Method PMU 3 PMU 4 PMU 6 PMU 13
PMU 4
Shortest Path 1:25 10 4 1 0 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 1 0 0
PMU 5
Shortest Path 6:25 10 6 1:25 10 4 0 6:25 10 6
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0
PMU 6
Shortest Path 0 0 1 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0 1 1:25 10 4
PMU 7
Shortest Path 0 0 1:25 10 4 6:25 10 6
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0
PMU 8
Shortest Path 0 0 0 6:25 10 6
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0
shown in Table 4.13. In the second scenario, we consider two PMUs under attack and we
calculate the percentage of other PMUs that are likely to be compromised. We repeat this
process for each pair of PMUs, then we calculate the average percentage of all PMUs as
shown in Table 4.14. It is clear that compromising more PMUs will increase the number
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Table 4.10: Probability of attack propagation (IEEE 24-bus)
Compromised PMU Method PMU 1 PMU 2 PMU 3 PMU 5 PMU 6 PMU 7
PMU 2 Shortest Path 1:25 10 4 1 1:25 10 4 6:25 10 6 0 0
Proposed Model 0 1 0 0 0 0
PMU 3 Shortest Path 6:25 10 6 1:25 10 4 1 1:25 10 4 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 1 0 1:25 10 4 0
PMU 4 Shortest Path 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU 5 Shortest Path 3:125 10 7 6:25 10 6 1:25 10 4 1 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 1 0 0
PMU 6 Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 1 6:25 10 6
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 1 0
Table 4.11: Probability of attack propagation (IEEE 30-bus)
Compromised
PMU
Method PMU 1 PMU 2 PMU 3 PMU 4 PMU 6 PMU 7 PMU 9
PMU 2 Shortest Path 1:25 10 4 1 1:25 10 4 0 0 3:125 10 7 1:57 10 8
Proposed Model 0 1 1:25 10 4 0 0 0 0
PMU 3 Shortest Path 6:25 10 6 1:25 10 4 1 0 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
PMU 4 Shortest Path 0 0 0 1 0 1:25 10 4 6:25 10 6
Proposed Model 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
PMU 5 Shortest Path 3:125 10 7 6:25 10 6 1:25 10 4 1:25 10 4 0 6:25 10 6 3:125 10 7
Proposed Model 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 0 0 0
PMU 6 Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 1 0 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
PMU 7 Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 0 1 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
PMU 9 Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 1
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
PMU
10
Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 6:25 10 6 0 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of other connected PMUs that are likely to be compromised. This is because attacking
more PMUs increases the propagation of the attack during the same t time, as discussed
earlier. From Tables 4.13 and 4.14, we can see that the propagation of the attack and the
size of the system has an inverse relationship as the probability decreases when the network
size increases for both multicast trees; however, our tree construction still outperforms the
shortest path with lower attack propagation probability.
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Table 4.12: Probability of attack propagation (IEEE 57-bus)
Compromise
PMU
Method PMU 1 PMU 2 PMU 8 PMU 9 PMU 11 PMU 13 PMU 15 PMU 16 PMU 17
PMU 1 Shortest Path 0 1:25 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU 2 Shortest Path 1:25 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU 6 Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4
PMU 7 Shortest Path 0 0 6:25 10 6 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4
PMU
10
Shortest Path 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU
11
Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU
12
Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 6:25 10 6 0 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU
14
Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PMU
15
Shortest Path 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1:25 10 4 0
Proposed Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.13: Average % of PMUs that are likely to be compromised (with one initially
compromised PMU)
Model IEEE 14-bus IEEE 24-bus IEEE 30-bus New England 39-bus IEEE 57-bus
Shortest Path 19% 22% 19% 5% 4%
Proposed Model 6% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Then, we compare the computational time of our proposed tree construction in each test
system as shown in Table 4.15. It is clear that the run time of our trees is relatively small.
In particular, in the 57-bus test system, the time needed to construct the 17 multicast trees
is less than 4 seconds. This shows that our tree construction method is quite scalable for
larger systems. We nonetheless believe that efficient tree construction methods for larger
WAMS systems, while considering cyber attacks, using efficient heuristics could be subject
for further investigation, which currently is outside the scope of this work.
Finally, we note that, as discussed earlier, the objective of our tree model is to minimize
the probability of attack propagation, which can be done by maximizing the nodal distance
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Table 4.14: Average % of PMUs that are likely to be compromised (with two initially
compromised PMU)
Model IEEE 14-bus IEEE 24-bus IEEE 30-bus New England 39-bus IEEE 57-bus
Shortest Path 30% 38% 31% 9% 8%
Proposed Model 11% 4% 4% 1% 1%
Table 4.15: CPU run-time using the proposed tree construction
IEEE 14-bus IEEE 14-bus IEEE 14-bus New England 39-bus IEEE 57-bus
.95 seconds .98 seconds 1.22 seconds 2.67 seconds 3.56 seconds
between PMUs while satisfying real-time requirements. Even though our proposed multi-
cast trees did not eliminate the attack propagation completely, our model outperform, with
lower propagation probability, the shortest path tree specially for large test systems.
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5. A Power System Observability-Based
Recovery Scheme for WAMS Phasor
Data Collection
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter (1), today’s smart grid tightly connects the power generation,
transmission, distribution, and consumption using advanced IT technologies to provide re-
liable, resilient, and cost-efficient energy services. However, due to the increase in power
demand, modern transmission power systems are often operating close to their stability
limits causing several disturbances and power outages [131]. This has increased the impor-
tance of implementing suitable and efficient techniques for analyzing, monitoring, predict-
ing, and quickly recovering possible disturbances in the system. As a consequence, there is
a need for a technology that facilitates the understanding and management of the increas-
ingly complex behaviour exhibited by large power systems. Therefore, a new technology
for real-time monitoring, control, and protection through synchronized phasor measure-
ments is proposed. Such technology allows the grid monitoring and control to be adjusted
depending on the evolution of events in real-time, which involves the use of PMU, PDC,
communication technologies, and applications that rely on synchrophasor measurements.
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These measurements are synchronized with the time signal of a Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) with a sampling rate in the order of milliseconds, which gives adequate tools
to monitor, control, and protect the smart grid in a wide geographical area. One of the
benefiting applications of such technology is state estimation application that estimates the
state of the grid based on real-time synchrophasors. An accurate and secure estimate of the
grid is of great importance for several applications such as power protection, contingency
analysis, voltage stability, real-time pricing, etc. Therefore, the availability of synchropha-
sor is crucial to the system observability and the estimation process. A system is said to be
observable if based on the received measurements the system state can be estimated.
5.1.1 State Estimation
The power system state estimation has been proposed since the sixties. Prof Schweppe,
the leading researcher of the Power System Engineering Group at MIT, was the first to
develop the idea of state estimation for power system monitoring. State estimation is used
in system monitoring to best estimate the grid through the analysis of the received mea-
surements. The state estimation is designed to handle uncertainties using measurement
readings with an actual system in real time [132]. These uncertainties are due to communi-
cation errors, incomplete measurements, unexpected system changes, etc. The goal of the
estimator is to ”clean up” the input data and provide a reliable set of state estimates to the
control center that truly represent the actual system states.
The state estimation uses power flow models, which is a set of equations that describe
the energy flow on transmission lines. An Alternate Current (AC) power flow model is a
power flow model that consists of both a real and a reactive power flow model. AC power
flow can be represented using non-linear equations, which is computationally expensive to
solve in many cases for large power systems. Thus, power system engineers often consider
the Direct Current (DC) power flow model, which considers only the real power and can be
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represented using linear formulation. Although the DC power flow model is less accurate
than the AC power flow model, the DC model is simpler than the AC model [28].
The state estimators are generally based on a weighted least-squares cost criterion
[132], which has a long history of successful applications in many fields. However, this
criterion is very sensitive to bad data, which may cause poor estimates. Consequently,
power system researchers proposed Bad Data Detection (BDD) algorithms to detect the
presence of such bad data.
The estimation process is solved iteratively using weighted least squares estimator
(WLS), which is a widely used and well-investigated method. WLS estimator is non-robust
in the presence of bad measurements; thus, a bad data processor to detect, identify, and cor-
rect any existing bad data should be carried out. Here, we present a common formulation
of the state estimation problem under DC power flow model.
z = Hx+ e (5.1)
where H 2 RMN is the dc power flow matrix, z 2 RM ; x 2 RN , and e 2 RM
are the sensor measurements vector, the system state vector, and the measurements noise
vector, respectively. Moreover, Hx is a vector of m linear functions linking measurements
to states, where we have m measurements and n state variables.
With the increased deployment of PMUs, conventional state estimators are assumed to
be replaced with all-PMU state estimator [21] due to their optimal deployment and utiliza-
tion for a wide variety of power system control applications. Much research interest has
been developed to propose and enhance the conventional state estimation process to utilize
the phasor measurements. In [133], an estimation algorithm based on alternating minimiza-
tion and parallel Kalman filtering using PMUs with phase mismatch has been proposed.
The authors in [134] enhanced the classical state estimation to utilize synchronized phasor
measurements in a non-invasive fashion.
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As mentioned earlier, WLS is a well-known and widely used method for state estima-
tion. This algorithm is iterative when conventional measurements are used; however, it can
be simplified and non-iterative when only PMU measurements are used. The measurement
and WLS estimation equations will take the following form:
x^ = (HTWH) 1HTWz (5.2)
where W is a diagonal matrix whose elements are the measurements wights.
To ensure the system observability, enough measurements should arrive at the estimator
to make the state estimation process possible. The minimum set of measurements needed
to estimate the n state variables is commonly called basic measurements, and the remain-
ing measurements are referred to as redundant measurements [23]. However, observability
tests can be carried out based on the properties of the measurements Jacobian H . If the Ja-
cobian has full column rank, then the system will be considered fully observable. Note that
for dc estimators, any set of n measurements whose corresponding rows in H are linearly
independent are sufficient to solve the n state variables, which means that it contains the set
of basic measurements. That is, n independent linear equations are sufficient to solve for n
variables. In other words, the rank of H should be equal to n, which means that at least n
rows of H are linearly independent vectors. These rows should correspond to at least one
set of the basic measurements. Note that the choice of a set of basic measurements is not
unique, multiple sets of basic measurements exist [23]. Finding the set of basic measure-
ments has been addressed in many research work including [135–137]. A straight forward
but brute force approach is to randomly choose a set of n measurements out of m and see
if the rows corresponding to them in H are linearly independent [23].
In general, WAMS requires more information to be transmitted and processed to improve
the grid efficiency [138]. However, the wide use of communication networks creates more
vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. Such attacks are especially harmful if, as a consequence,
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physical damages are made on the power quality and devices. Therefore, the security of
WAMS is a key factor in smart grid technology, since errors of monitoring measurements
introduced by malicious attackers will cause wrong decisions, which may lead to catas-
trophic consequences. A multitude of security threats targeting WAMS such as false data
injection attack, DoS, man-in-the-middle, and replay attack has been discussed in the lit-
erature. For example, inaccuracies in the state information arising from cyber-attacks can
result in a severe degradation of the grid’s performance, affect accurate predictions of trans-
mission status, and result in delays in the mitigation of power network failures.
Even though WAMS communication network tends to be a dedicated Intranet, this does
not mean that such networks are immune to cyber-attacks. For instance, removable media
such as USB drives can be used to carry malware, and hack computers for later use as
attack sources. Moreover, a large number of mobile devices can be used as a malicious
medium, and we cannot rule out the possibility that utility employees directly attack the
network [8, 106]. More importantly, regardless of the causes, the impacts of acting on
incorrect or missing information will have already propagated into the rest of the system.
At this stage, it may already be too late to avoid a wide-area power outage within the
grid [106].
As PMUs and PDCs are connected via an IP-based network where malware at a com-
promised PMU or PDC can infect other devices through network connections [122, 139].
Consequently, upon detection of attacks, compromised PMU or PDCs should be discon-
nected from the communication network to avoid cyber-attack propagation as suggested
by NIST [140]. Although the disconnection of compromised PMUs or PDCs can prevent
further propagation of the attack, the traffic initiated from those devices can no longer reach
WAMS applications. As a result to this disconnection, the system observability can be sig-
nificantly reduced as the estimation process can not be performed based on the received
synchrophasors; hence, affect other WAMS applications.
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Figure (5.1) shows an illustrative example where two PDCs are receiving measurements
from different PMUs. One PDC (PDC1) is detected to be under attack. To prevent the
attack propagation PDC1 is disconnected from the network, which means losing measure-
ments from (PMU1 and PMU2) even though both PMUs can send trusted measurements.
Losing some PMU measurements might have an impact on the system observability; thus
to maintain the observability some measurements need to be re-routed to other connected
PDC (PDC 2). However, such process needs to take into consideration WAMS functional
requirements such as end-to-end delay from the PMU to the new PDC and the value of
the PDC timer. As straightforward rerouting may violate the end-to-end delay, or cause a
measurement drop due to the expiration of the PDC timer. Moreover, this rerouting should
consider the possible impact on other connected PMUs (PMU3, PMU4, and PMU5).
Based on the above-mentioned challenges, the contribution of this chapter is to mitigate
the impact of attacks on PDCs in a timely manner. We investigate the rerouting process of
un-compromised PMUs (after disconnecting a compromised PDC) to other connected un-
compromised PDCs after attacks while considering delay and timer requirements. Such
rerouting ensure system observability, and prevent consequences of the loss of PMU mea-
surements. The presented approach is formulated as a linear program taking into consider-
ation the functionality constraints of WAMS network, and the use of PMU measurements
in system observability.
5.2 System Model
In general, WAMS applications rely on synchrophasor from remote measurement de-
vices at substations and in the field. synchrophasor measurements are communicated back
to the control centre/application through an IP-based network using a variety of protocols
and communication media such as the IEEE C37.118 [141] and the IEC 61850-90-5 [142].












Figure 5.1: An Illustrative Example
PMUs with the same time stamp into a time-stamped buffer. A timer per time-stamped
buffer is added. The countdown of the timer starts when the first measurement with a new
time stamp arrives at the PDC. Then, the PDC assigns a new buffer to this newly arrived
measurement and starts the timer. When the timer goes off, the PDC forwards the received
measurements without waiting for the entire measurements to arrive. In case of delays,
this wait time ensures that the PDC forwards the phasor measurements in an acceptable
time range without waiting for the delayed measurements to arrive. However, this timer
introduces the issue of data incompleteness when synchrophasor measurements arrive after
the expiration of the PDC timer are dropped at the PDC [30].
5.2.1 Problem Description
To achieve the goals of WAMS, from a communication network perspective, measure-
ments from PMUs should be securely sent and delivered to PDCs and the control centre.
From physical system perspective, PMUs installed in different parts of the grid should en-
sure the observability of the whole system in real-time, so that state estimation and other
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advanced power system applications can be performed.
After a detection of a cyber-attack targeting PDCs, the compromised PDCs are discon-
nected from the network to avoid the propagation of cyber-attack to other connected nodes
in the network. Although this disconnection helps in minimizing the attack propagation,
it degrades the system observability. Simply because disconnecting a PDC means discon-
necting all PMUs sending to that PDC, even though they might not be compromised; hence,
the received measurements at the control system might not be enough to ensure system ob-
servability. Thus, a fast mitigation of the impact of such an attack needs to be considered
and the disconnected un-compromised PMUs need to be re-routed to other PDCs to main-
tain the system observability. Therefore, in this chapter, we propose a mathematical model
to re-route disconnected and un-compromised PMUs to other PDCs to maintain the system
observability. As opposed to existing work [89], we consider the end-to-end delay and PDC
timer during the re-routing process.
System Observability
A system is said to be observable if, based on the received synchrophasor measure-
ments, we get enough information to determine the state of the system in real-time. When
a PMU is installed at a bus, the voltage phasor at that bus and current phasor of all branches
connected to it can be measured.
In general, the observability function of a bus m 2 B is defined as a function of the









1 if a PMU is installed at bus n
0 otherwise
and amn is the connectivity parameter, defined as:
amn =
8>><>>:
1 if m = nor (m;n) 2 L
0 otherwise
where L is a set of transmission lines and Om  1 implies that bus m is observable, as
the voltage phasor at bus m can be either measured by the PMU at bus m, or be calcu-
lated by PMUs at neighbours of bus m. The power system is said to be observable if the
observability function Om for each bus is greater than or equal to 1:
Om  1; 8m 2 B (5.4)
With the disconnection of some PDCs due to cyber-attacks, the observability function
Om at some buses may become 0; thus, the system is no longer observable. However,
it is possible to reconnect some disconnected yet un-compromised PMUs to the commu-
nication network to restore the system observability. During the process of reconnecting
un-compromised PMUs, the timer of each PDC and the end-to-end delay need to be con-
sidered. Moreover, this process should not have an impact on other connected PMUs.
5.2.2 Problem Definition
Consider a distributed WAMS with a set of PMUs Nu = fu1; :::; ujNujg and a set of
PDCs Nc = fc1; :::; cjNcjg.
The system can be abstracted to a directed graphGc = (N;E), whereE is a set of edges
(communication lines) and N is a set of nodes such that N = Nu [ Nc [ Nr. The notion
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Nr represents a set of routers connecting PMUs and PDCs where Nr = fr1; : : : ; rjNrjg.
Each PDC c receives synchrophasor measurements from a set of PMUs. Let Uc =
fuigxic=1 be the set of PMUs sending their measurements to PDC c, where xic is equal to
one when PMU i sends measurements to PDC c.
On the other hand, we consider a power transmission network abstracted as a graph
Gp(B;L), whereB denotes the set of buses and L denotes the set of transmission lines. We
assume that PMUs are installed in different part of the grid to ensure system observability
[105]. Let Nu be the set of buses where PMUs are installed where Nu  B.
After the disconnection of PDCs as response to cyber-attack, we check the observability
function at each bus m. Depending on the system observability, we either wait for the
compromised PDCs to be fixed or consider solving the following problem to recover the
system observability and find the best route to connect PMUs with PDCs such that equation
(5.4) satisfies.
Let c be the compromised detected PDC that has been disconnected from the network
to avoid cyber-attack propagation and Uc = fuigxuic=1 be the set of PMUs sending to PDC
c.
If a PDC is disconnected then measurements from all PMUs sending to this PDC will
be lost and Om might not be equal to one for all buses. In this case, we need to find the
minimum number of the disconnected PMUs ui 2 Uc to be rerouted such that Om  1 for
all buses.
Let yuc and yucij be binary variables such that:
yuc =
8>><>>:





1 if the path from utoctravers link(i; j)
0 otherwise
Therefore, the objective function of the proposed model is to reroute the least number
of measurements from disconnected PMUs that can improve the system observability. This








 System observability: this constraint ensures that the new re-routed measurements
maintain the system observability by checking the observability function Om for each bus
m 2 B.




amn  xn 
X
c
ync  1 8m 2 B (5.6)
 PDC timer and end-to-end delay constraints: a measurement u 2 Uc can be re-routed
to PDC c if its end-to-end delay uc (from the source PMU to the destination PDC) is less
than a specified threshold (Th), and if it arrives at the PDC within an acceptable time
window (defined by the timer which is initiated when a PMU measurement with a new
time stamp arrives first); this can be translated mathematically as follows:
uc  Th (5.7)
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uc  uc + tout (5.8)
where tout is the PDC timer, and uc is the delay of the first received measurements with
a new time stamp. In other words, uc = min
u
(uc). Knowing the time of the first re-
ceived measurement, and the timer length for a PDC is useful for calculating the number
of received measurements within a timeout period as described in equation (5.8). To write
uc expression as a minimum into a Linear Program format, we introduce the following
variables. Let xcuu0 and x
0
uc be binary variables such that:
xcuu0 =
8>><>>:












uc  u0c + tout + xcuu0  M; 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Ncnfcg; u0 2 Nu; u 6= u0 (5.9)
uc  u0c + tout   (1   xcuu0)M; 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Ncnfcg; u0 2 Nu; u 6= u0 (5.10)
Constraints (5.9) and (5.10) are the linearization of the decision variable xcuu0 , where u0c is






uc   1; 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Ncnfcg (5.11)
X
u0 6=u
xcuu0  x0uc M; 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Ncnfcg (5.12)
X
u0 6=u
xcuu0  0; 8u 2 Nu; c 2 Ncnfcg (5.13)
Constraints (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13) specify that when the measurement (u) arrives within
c’s timer, then the value of x0uc should be equal to zero.
The end-to-end communication delay from a source to a destination can be described as
the sum of processing delay, queuing delay, transmission delay, and propagation delay on
each link along the path connecting the source (PMU) and destination (PDC). Processing
delay can be neglected since routers are considered as forwarding nodes (no processing),
measurements processing occurs at end nodes (PDCs) [102]. Moreover, the propagation
delay is assumed to be no more than 1 microsecond [102]. Thus, each link (i; j) along the








where tijtrans and tijque are the transmission delays and queuing delays on link (i; j) respec-
tively. The transmission delay tijtrans on (i; j) is calculated as follows:
tijtrans = fij=Cij; 8(i; j) 2 E (5.15)
where fij is the total flow (e.g., number of packets carrying measurements) on link (i; j)








fuij; 8(i; j) 2 E (5.16)
where fuij is the flow from PMU u on link (i; j).
The queuing delay (of packets at node i which are forwarded on link (i; j) can be
determined by the traffic behaviour and can be approximated as follows:
tijque = 1=(  ij); 8(i; j) 2 E (5.17)
where  is the mean service rate (e.g., average number of packets processed per second by
the router) which depends on the port speed and ij is the average rate of traffic arriving to
this port; ij is modelled as a function of the flow conservation variables yucij . Finally, the
propagation delay tijprop is calculated by the distance between nodes and the speed of light
in the communication medium.




yucij ijtrans; 8c 2 Ncnfcg; u 2 Nu (5.18)
 Flow Conservation Constraints: to deliver measurements between PMUs and PDCs








yuc if i = u 8u 2 Uc
 yuc ifi = c 8c 2 Ncnfcg




yucij 8u 2 Uc; (i; j) 2 E (5.19)
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fuij  yucij 8u 2 Uc; c 2 Ncnfcg; (i; j) 2 E (5.20)
The first Constraint represents the flow conservation constraints for yucij . Constraints (5.19)
and (5.20) describe the relation between yucij and f
u
ij as if link (i; j) is on the path from u to
c, then this link should have flow from PMU u.
 Edge Capacity Constraint: to ensure that the constructed tree satisfies edge capacity
constraints we use the following constraint:
fij  Cij; 8(i; j) 2 E (5.21)
 One PDC is selected for each PMU: this constraint ensure that PMU u 2 Uc is sending
to at most one PDC c. X
c2Nc fcg
yuc  1; 8u 2 Uc (5.22)
yuc  yucij 8(i; j) 2 E; u 2 Uc; c 2 Ncnfcg (5.23)
5.3 Numerical Results
To evaluate the proposed approach, and its usefulness in maintaining system observ-
ability, we implemented the developed model and related simulation programs using Java
and IBM CPLEX concert technology. The simulations were executed on a windows ma-
chine with Intel Core i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz and equipped with 6 GB of RAM. We
tested our approach on the 14-bus, 24-bus, and 30-bus IEEE test systems (for details about
those systems, interested readers are referred to [127–129]), and compared the collected re-
sults with the approach presented in [89]. Moreover, our numerical results are contrasted to
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those of a base method that re-routes measurements from disconnected PMUs to available
PDCs to maintain system observability.
In our system setup, we consider the electric grid to be observable when all of its sys-
tem states are uniquely identified [104]. Those states can be estimated at the control center
based on the measurements received from sensors dispersed across the grid. This is made
possible through the deployment of PMUs at optimal bus locations in the grid as presented
by [105]. We adopt the results of [105] for PMU placement under normal operating condi-
tions with no conventional measurements for system observability. The optimal number of
PMUs for each test system is presented in Table 5.1 along with the corresponding bus loca-
tions. Each of those PMUs sends its measurements to a randomly selected set of PDCs with
sampling rate up to 60 samples/second. The synchrophasor sampling rate varies depending
on the application. For example, control applications require high sampling rate up to 120
samples/second while some monitoring application such as the state estimation requires
30-60 samples/second [143]. The bandwidth considered in this set up is 2-5 Mbits/s for
applications with low to medium data rate [109]. We also consider packet size of 128 bytes
similar to what has been proposed in [12]. Moreover, the communication links are placed in
parallel with the transmission lines and each bus is represented as a communication node
which can send, receive and route measurements [80]. For a detailed model of realistic
communication for the IEEE 14-bus standard test system readers are refereed to [108].
We conducted two sets of experiments to analyze the usefulness of our approach in
mitigating the impact of cyber attacks on PDCs. The first set of experiments presume the
deployment of the optimal number of PMUs only at the locations identified in Table 5.1.
Under this assumption, we consider attacks targeting a single PDC at a time and then mul-
tiple PDCs, and report on the ability of the compared approaches to fulfill system observ-
ability. In the second set of experiments, we add redundant PMUs into each test system,
and evaluate the impact of the compared approaches in restoring system observability in
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Table 5.1: Optimal PMU number and placement for each test system
Test System Number of PMUs Bus Locations
IEEE 14-bus 4 2,6,7,9
IEEE 24-bus 7 2,3,8,10,16,21,23
IEEE 30-bus 10 2,3,6,9,10,12,15,19,25,27
the presence of single and multiple PDC failures. The PMU to PDC connectivity for IEEE
14-Bus, 24-Bus and 30-Bus systems, under optimal PMU placement and in the presence
of redundant PMUs, is presented in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 respectively where we identify
each PMU by its respective bus location. Those tables are based on results collected from
our previous work [143] that establishes multicast trees for PMUs in the WAMS commu-
nication network.
Table 5.2: PMU to PDC Connectivity - 14 Bus System
PDC
PMU Optimal Redundant




Table 5.3: PMU to PDC Connectivity - 24 Bus System
PDC
PMU Optimal Redundant
2 3 8 10 16 21 23 11 12 17
1 X X X
2 X X X
3 X X
4 X X
5.3.1 Optimal PMU placement for system observability:
In this subsection, we consider the minimum number of PMUs to ensure system ob-
servability as proposed in [105]. Each PMU sends its measurement to a destination PDC
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Table 5.4: PMU to PDC Connectivity - 30 Bus System
PDC
PMU Optimal Redundant
1 2 6 9 10 12 15 19 25 27 7 17 22
1 X X X
2 X X X
3 X X
4 X X X
5 X X
as indicated in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. Under a PDC attack, the compromised PDC is
disconnected from the network to prevent attack propagation, which has an impact on the
system observability as discussed before. To mitigate the impact of such attack, we re-route
the uncompromised disconnected PMUs to other PDCs in the network using different ap-
proaches, and we comment on the observed outcome.
Single PDC Attack
In the first set of experiments, we disconnected PDC-2 along with the connected PMUs
from the WAMS network of the bus systems under study. This resulted in a drop in system
observability to 71%, 84% and 77% for 14-Bus, 24-Bus and 30-Bus systems respectively
due to loss of PMU data stream from PDC-2. To mitigate this loss in observability, we exe-
cuted the proposed model along with the approach presented in [89] and the observability-
base model. Based on our approach, measurements from the disconnected PMUs are routed
to new PDCs as shown in Table 5.5. The effect of this reestablished connectivity on system
observability is presented in Table 5.6. As Table 5.6 shows, all approaches achieve 100%
observability of the 14-Bus system while varying the timer value for the available PDCs.
This is mainly due to the small system size which allows the timely arrival of the rerouted
measurements from the disconnected PMUs to the newly assigned PDCs, and thus full
system observability.
The increase in system size, as in the case of 24-Bus and 30-Bus systems, affects the
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achieved observability. This effect can be best noticed for the base approach which aims
at achieving observability without any consideration of the network status. The increase
in system size affects the observability achieved by [89] in the presence of a short PDC
timer period (30 ms) since the approach presented in [89] considers end-to-end network
delay without any consideration for the PDC times restrictions. Compared to the previ-
ous approaches, our proposed model succeeds in attaining a 100% system observability
for various timer values since it considers this factor among others while rerouting the
measurements from the disconnected PDC.
Table 5.5: Optimal PMU to PDC Post Attack Connectivity
Test System
Single PDC Attack Multiple PDC Attack
PMU PDC PMU PDC
14-Bus 6 3 * 1
24-Bus
2 1 2 1




1 5 1 3
10 5 10 5




For the second set of experiments, we consider an attack on multiple PDCs in the
WAMS network. Along with PDC-2 that fails in the first set of experiments, PDC-3 and
PDC-4 are disconnected from the 24-Bus and 30-Bus networks respectively, and can no
longer forward PMU data streams. Due to loss of those PDCs, system observability drops
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Table 5.6: Observability percentage under single PDC attack
Test System Model
Timer
30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-Bus
Proposed Model 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 100% 100% 100% 100%
Observability 100% 100% 100% 100%
IEEE 24-Bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100% 100% 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 92% 100% 100 % 100 %
Observability 46 % 63% 63 % 71 %
IEEE 30-Bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 92 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Observability 87 % 90 % 90 % 90 %
to 57%, 62%, and 53% for 14-Bus, 24-Bus, and 30-Bus systems respectively. Follow-
ing a similar approach to that in the presence of a single PDC failure, we attempted to
improve the system observability through routing of disconnected PMUs to the available
PDCs using different approaches. For post attack recovery, our proposed model connects
the disconnected PMUs to available PDCs as outlined in Table 5.5. This allows for the col-
lection of measurements from those PMUs, and the reevaluation of system observability.
The effect of this connectivity on observability is presented in Table 5.7. The collected re-
sults demonstrate the ability of our proposed approach to ensure 100% system observability
for the 14-Bus system for different PDC timer values, while the other two approaches fail
in ensuring full system observability for short PDC timer values. This loss in observability
is mainly caused by the need to reroute more measurements over communication channels
that were already in use. This change results in an increase in the communication delay over
those links, and thus PMU measurements arrival upon expiration of PDC timer. Moreover,
for the 24-Bus system, the proposed approach outperforms the other two for strict timer
requirements (30 ms) and achieves complete system observability for larger timer values.
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Table 5.7: Observability percentage under multiple PDC attack
Test System Model
Timer
30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-Bus
Proposed Model 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 71% 100% 100% 100%
Observability 64 % 64 % 64 % 64 %
IEEE 24-Bus
Proposed Model 92 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 87 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Observability 25 % 87 % 83 % 55 %
IEEE 30-Bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 92 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Observability 30 % 30 % 40 % 57 %
However, the observability-base model suffers most due to the large changes in the sys-
tem and the need to reroute several measurements. This leads to dropping various needed
measurements that do not make it before the timer expiration of receiving PDCs. As for
the 30-Bus system, our model outperforms the other approaches and succeeds in achieving
100% observability for all timer values. The observability-based approach suffers most the
effects of increase in network size and drop in number of available PDCs.
5.3.2 WAMS network with redundant PMUs:
In this section, we randomly introduce additional PMUs to the WAMS network. We
add two PMUs for the 14-Bus system, and three PMUs for each of the 24-Bus and 30-
Bus systems. The bus locations of those PMUs and the PDCs they are connected to are
indicated in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. This allows us to evaluate the success of the different
approaches in attaining post PDC attack system observability for the cases of attack on
single or multiple PDCs in the presence of redundant PMU measurements.
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Table 5.8: System Observability in presence of redundant PMUs and attack on single PDC
Test System Model
Timer
30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 100% 100% 100% 100%
Observability 93% 93% 86% 100%
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Observability 58 % 87 % 100 % 100 %
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100 % 100 % 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 100% 100% 100% 100 %
Observability 93 % 80 % 93 % 80 %
Single PDC Attack
We again consider an attack that results in the disconnection of PDC-2 from the WAMS
network. In the presence of redundant PMUs, system observability achieved by the differ-
ent approaches is outlined in Table 5.8.
Similar to the setup in Section 5.3.1, we evaluated the different approaches while vary-
ing the timer for the available PDCs. As can be noticed from the results in Table 5.8, the
availability of redundant PMUs has a negative impact on the achieved observability using
the base method in the case of 14-Bus systems. This is mainly due to the delay imposed by
the redundant measurements on the communication network, and resulting in the arrival of
optimal PMU measurements upon PDC timer expiration. However, for our approach and
that of [89], the availability of redundant measurements does not impact system observabil-
ity since both approaches consider the network delay when rerouting disconnected PMU
measurements to available PDCs.
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Multiple PDC Attack
In the presence of an attack targeting multiple PDCs, more PMUs are disconnected
and thus there is a need to reestablish connectivity between these PMUs and the available
PDCs. The success of the different approaches in establishing this connectivity and im-
proving post attack system observability is presented in Table 5.10. For the IEEE 14-Bus
system, the proposed approach succeeds in restoring full system observability for different
PDC timer values. This gives an advantage for our solution over the base approach and that
of [89]. This advantage is a result of considering an additional factor when reestablishing
the connectivity, namely the restrictions imposed by the PDC timer values. This advan-
tage is more noticeable with the increase in the system size as is the case with the 24-Bus
and 30-Bus systems, where the proposed model outperforms the other approaches in the
achieved system observability. However, comparing those results with the ones from Table
5.7, we can notice that the availability of additional PMUs is not sufficient to get better ob-
servability. The lack of positive impact of redundant PMUs on post attack observability can
be understood as a result of the alteration in network traffic and PDC timer functionality,
where redundant measurements might be first arrivals at a PDC and trigger the respective
PDC timer. Thus, not providing a large enough window for needed measurements to arrive
at their destination PDCs in a timely manner.
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Table 5.9: Redundant PMU-PDC Post Attack Connectivity
Test System
Single PDC Attack Multiple PDC Attack
PMU PDC PMU PDC
14-Bus 6 3 * 1
24-Bus
2 1 2 1




1 5 1 1
10 - 10 5








30 ms 40 ms 50 ms 60 ms
IEEE 14-bus
Proposed Model 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lin. et. al. [89] 50% 64% 100% 100%
Observability 79% 36% 86% 72%
IEEE 24-bus
Proposed Model 96 % 92 % 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 84 % 75 % 100 % 100 %
Observability 54 % 50 % 50 % 62 %
IEEE 30-bus
Proposed Model 100 % 100% 100 % 100 %
Lin. et. al. [89] 80 % 100 % 100 % 100 %




This thesis addressed several challenges and concerns associated with WAMS com-
munication network security. Mainly, it focused on the relation between WAMS security
and the IP routing protocol, which is an essential aspect of the collection of synchrophasor
measurements.
At first, Chapter 2 presented an overview of WAMS, its benefits, components, and
security concerns. We concluded Chapter 2 with a survey of the existing literature work
addressing attacks targeting WAMS and the impact of such attacks on the operations of the
grid.
Motivated by the challenges learned from the literature survey, in chapter 3, we pro-
posed a mathematical model for PMU communication routing in WAMS to enhance the
network performance against delay attacks. The objective of this model is minimize the
number of invalid measurements, which are measurements that arrive after the expiration
of the PDC timer or after the end-to-end delay threshold. We considered different IEEE test
systems to evaluate the performance of our proposed model in comparison with different
approaches. Then, we simulated a delay attack targeting critical links on the network. We
observe that in case of an attack our proposed model manages to find trees that minimize
the impact of delays while satisfying real-time requirements.
Next, in chapter 4, we studied the propagation of cyber-attacks in WAMS. We addressed
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the relation between cyber-attack propagation and IP multicast routing protocol in PMUs
network. We presented a mathematical formulation of a multicast tree construction model
that minimizes the probability of attack propagation while satisfying real time and capacity
requirements. We evaluated our proposed multicast trees in comparison with shortest path
multicast trees. Our numerical results show that our proposed tree model achieves lower
probability of cyber-attack propagation even for larger test systems.
Synchrophasor technology is used for real-time control and monitoring in smart grid.
The delivery of phasor measurements from PMUs to the control center relies on the avail-
ability of a reliable communication network, and phasor data concentrators to align and
aggregate measurements into data streams. The loss of a PDC from this network affects a
stream of phasors from several PMUs. Thus, recovery from PDC failure or loss is essen-
tial for the timely delivery of phasor measurements to control and monitoring applications.
Therefore, in chapter 5, we proposed a post PDC failure recovery scheme to restore con-
nectivity with disconnected PMUs, and recover thier phasor measurements. The proposed
scheme is mathematically formulated into a linear program that considers the functional de-
tails of the WAMS network, and succeeds in reestablishing the affected system observabil-
ity. Tests on the IEEE standard bus systems demonstrated the usability and effectiveness of
our approach in maintaining system observability, and its advantage over other approaches
in the literature.
6.2 Future Directions
Over the past two decades, the research community has witnessed a wave of discussion
toward setting the path for the grid of the future, a smart, failure and attack-resilient, and
self-healing grid. We have witnessed the birth of advanced technologies and applications
that enable the migration towards the smart grid. Those applications and technologies are
introducing new vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. In this thesis, we have addressed several
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challenges associated with the security of WAMS. This section of the thesis highlights
potential challenges and directions for future research.
6.2.1 Effective Delay Attack
As mentioned previously, WAMS applications rely on synchrophasor from remote mea-
surement devices at substations and in the field. synchrophasor measurements are commu-
nicated back to the control center/application using a variety of protocols and communica-
tion media such as the IEEE C37.118 and the IEC 61850-90-5. The remote sensors and
the communication channels over which their readings are communicated present an attack
surface for attackers wanting to disrupt power system operations. Even though WAMS
communication network tends to be a dedicated Intranet, this does not mean that such net-
works are immune to cyber-attacks. In general, integrity attack such as false data injection
has been extensively studied in the literature and methods to choose the best attack vector
to cause an impact on the system without being detected has been proposed. Compared
to integrity attack, availability attack is considered easier since it requires fewer resources
to launch the attack. However, having a simple arbitrary delay attack might not have an
impact on the grid operations. Therefore, a straightforward availability attack might not
achieve the attacker objectives to disturb the grid operation. This is due to the fact that sim-
ply choosing random links to attack is not sufficient and the attacker needs to select critical
links carefully. Moreover, the amount of delay to inject in the network without being de-
tected need to be studied. Finally, the attacker needs to have a good understanding of the
communication network on hand to launch a successful availability attack. With the afore-
mentioned challenges in mind, an attacker model to find critical links to attack and how
much delay to inject in the network to disturb the grid operation without being detected is
a potential future work that needs to be investigated.
In particular, WAMS applications can be significantly affected by an availability attack
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since it heavily depends on transmitted synchrophasor. Therefore, the attacker should intro-
duce a network delay such that some measurements arrive after the expiration of the PDC
timer and then will be dropped at the PDC. The objective of the attacker should be to find
the minimum number of links to attack to cause a drop of measurements at the PDC (due to
the expiration of the timer) and have an impact on the application without being detected.
Moreover, the attacker needs to find the amount of delay to inject such that measurements
are being dropped at the PDC without being detected.
6.2.2 Delay Attack and Its Impact on Voltage Stability
Another possible future work direction is understanding delay attack and its impact on
voltage stability. Voltage stability has been regarded as one of the primary threats to the
security of modern power network operation during the past few decades. Power system
disturbances such as a continuous load increase and/or a major change in network topology
can result in voltage collapse. To avoid voltage collapse in a stressed power system, ade-
quate VAR support, which aims to maintain system voltage and to reduce real power trans-
mission loss, is required. Indeed, reactive power can be dispatched effectively to achieve
a secure and economic grid operation. A number of planning and operation technologies
have been proposed to reduce the possibility of voltage collapse.
Voltage regulation is important for maintaining the quality of power measured by the
voltage levels at the consumers’ side, which must stay within a given admissible range at all
times. One of the critical devices used for this control is the load ration control transformers
(LRTs) located at distribution substations. These are transformers whose secondary voltage
can be varied through switching their taps. Conventional control is based on the so-called
line drop compensator (LDC), which estimates the voltage at a fixed remote point in the
network via local measurements at the substation. However, when distributed generators
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are connected, steady state voltage rise may occur within the feeder. This changes the pro-
file characteristics, severely limiting the applicability of LDC. One solution to this issue is
to use sectionizing switches with sensors (called IT switches) in the feeders. Such switches
may be equipped with sensors for phase voltages and currents and also have voltage and
current transformers. By connecting the switches to the voltage regulator they can send
their voltage measurements. The voltage regulator can then obtain a more accurate voltage
profile of the feeder in real time to help determine the necessary output voltage level and
thus the tap position there. Notice that the use of voltage measurements in the grid requires
real-time data communication of the measurements from the switches. This increases the
chances of data delay and falsification by malicious attackers. The attacker may falsify
or delay a number of sensor measurement data to cause irregular tap changes, which may
result in voltage violation at feeder nodes or unnecessary tap changes that can damage the
device.
A demonstration of the impact of delay attack on the voltage stability through the use of
a simulator such as GridLAB-D, a power distribution system simulation and analysis tool,
to show the impact of unnecessary tap changes on the voltage stability is an interesting
point to be investigated.
After that, a mitigation mechanism to mitigate the impact of delay attacks need to be
studied. This mechanism will leverage the fact that the voltage profile in the feeder becomes
a decreasing function of distance from the substation. Hence, the estimate of the delayed
measurements can be made based on the voltage and the current at the LRT, the topology
information, past load data, and so on.
6.2.3 Robust PMU-PDC connectivity against loss of PDCs
Finally, as mentioned in 5, the disconnection of some PDCs due to cyber-attacks has an
impact on the system observability. However, it is possible to reconnect some disconnected
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yet uncompromised PMUs to the communication network to restore the system observabil-
ity. During the process of reconnecting un-compromised PMUs, the timer of each PDC and
the end-to-end delay need to be considered. Moreover, this reconnecting process should
not have an impact on other connected PMUs into consideration. As a continuation for this
work, an approach to design WAMS network robust against PDC loss can be investigated.
Such an approach should consider initial PMU to PDC connectivity that ensures the timely
collection of phasor measurements in the absence and presence of cyber attacks that might
bring one or several PDCs out of service.
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